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Abstract 
As evidenced by existing studies, housing development plays a central role in capitalism. 
However, little research has explored the logic of that role. This thesis contributes to filling 
this knowledge gap through a case study of housing development in post-war Japan. The case 
of Japan is interesting for the continuous increase in the national housing vacancy rate 
throughout the post-war period, which has reached an all-time high of 13.5% in 2013. The 
thesis argues that this phenomenon cannot be explained without considering the logic of the 
centrality of housing development in Japanese capitalism. 
The thesis builds an integrated approach of political economy and historical institutionalism 
to explore the aforementioned question. Applying this approach to the case of Japan, the 
analysis refers to the theory of the developmental state to analyze Japan’s macro political 
economy and to the concept of productive welfare capitalism to analyze the role of housing 
development in Japan’s capitalism. Based on a punctuated equilibrium model of institutional 
change, the research uses key ideas in historical institutionalist analysis - critical junctures 
and fast-moving/slow-moving institutions - to examine the transition of the state, the change 
in the way housing development was centralized in the state, and the state’s shaping of the 
supply-demand relationship in the housing market. The empirical evidence mainly derives 
from governmental documents and secondary sources. 
The main findings are as follows. Driven by the ideology of developmentalism, the central 
government of Japan has been directing the majority of resources to achieve developmentalist 
goals. Social policies have been expected to contribute to national economic growth rather 
than guarantee universal welfare rights to the citizen. Housing policies have been no 
exception. Throughout the post-war period, the central government has been intervening in 
housing provision and consumption through a variety of institutional measures such as 
welfare policies, finance policies, planning regulations, and taxation. The political logic of 
doing so lies in a desire to maximize the housing sector’s contribution toward national 
economic growth under the changing social-economic circumstances, while the choosing of 
interventions has also reaffirmed path dependence. The pro-growth interventions on housing 
have been interacting with the society and market and led to a dangerous oversupply of 
housing and an extremely high vacancy rate. 
The logic of the centrality of housing development in capitalism like Japan’s is embedded in 
the dominant economic ideology of the capitalist state. This ideology determines the role of 
housing in that state. It interacts with outside influential ideologies and drives change of the 
fast-moving institutions (e.g., policy and political institutions) that centralize housing 
development in the capitalist state. The way of change depends on the interaction between the 
slow-moving institution of ideologies and the fast-moving previous institutions. 
The research has also uncovered the social impact of Japan’s developmentalist housing 
policies. During economic stagnation, these policies have been driving continuous 
construction of new housing for economic recovery and have unavoidably accelerated the 
depreciation of old housing. They act as an invisible hand to transfer homeowners’ housing 
assets to the state, thereby supporting the state pursuing its developmentalist goals. 
Particularly, aged households, whose assets are largely embedded in their housing property, 
are more likely to suffer financial hardship and increased uncertainty. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
Empirical studies from around the world have shown that housing development plays a 
central role in capitalism (e.g., Haila, 2000; Schwartz & Seabrooke, 2008; Walks, 2014; Wu, 
2015). However, there is a persistent weakness in the theoretical basis of this research. Most 
of it is narrative-driven, describing how housing development is centralized in certain 
capitalist states but lacking of explanation on the considerable variation of that role in 
variegated capitalism. Without a solid theoretical framing penetrating to the logic of the role, 
it has been difficult to achieve more systematic comparative analyses of the role between 
countries and over time. It has further impeded the development of theory and cumulative 
knowledge-building. 
In this thesis, I argue that applying an integrated approach of political economy and historical 
institutionalism provides insights into the logic of the centrality of housing development in 
capitalism. A political economy perspective goes beyond a pure market analysis of housing 
and places housing development in the wider political-economic context, thereby enables 
exploring the role housing development plays in the capitalist state. Historical institutionalist 
analyses use institutions to find patterns and dynamics of the transition of the capitalist state 
over time. An integration of these two approaches enables tracing how housing development 
has been centralized in the capitalist state across time, thereby shedding some light on the 
logic of that process. 
The empirical case to be examined here is housing development in post-war Japan. This case 
is worthy of attention due to the astonishingly high-level vacancies across the country, which 
I argue that cannot be explained without examining the logic of the central role of housing 
development in Japanese capitalism. Japan’s housing vacancy rate has reached 13.5% in 2013 
(Statistics Bureau of Japan, 2013b). Such a number was unparalleled among advanced 
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capitalist countries. For instance, the national vacancy rate of the United Kingdom (UK) 
averaged 2.7% in 2013 (U.K. DCLG, 2013); the national vacancy rate in the United States 
(US) was approximately 8.3% for rental housing and 2.0% for home ownership in 2013 (US 
Census Bureau, 2016). Furthermore, Japan’s high vacancy rate is directly resulted from an 
almost continuous increase throughout the post-war period, rather an upsurge. And 
interestingly, the increase has been paradoxically co-existing with large-scale housing 
construction for decades, which contradicts the supply-demand relationship in classical 
economics. 
Drawing evidence mainly from governmental documents and secondary sources, the 
empirical study has three broad aims. The first is to examine the evolution of Japan’s post-
war housing policies and explain why the vacancy rate has been increasing continuously 
throughout the post-war period. This requires a historical understanding of the transition of 
the Japanese capitalist state and the role housing development plays in that state. Following 
the initial aim, the second aim is to critically evaluate governmental policies addressing the 
vacancy issue and examine the social impact of this issue, thereby offering policy 
suggestions. The third aim is to draw out the implication of the case study and form a 
theoretical understanding of the centrality of housing development in capitalism. 
 
1.1 The Centrality of Housing Development in Capitalism 
A more general perspective of the built environment in terms of capital circuits in capitalism 
offers a theoretical basis for the centrality of housing development in capitalism. Deriving 
from an inherent over-accumulation tendency in the process of capitalist development, 
surplus capital is switched from the primary capital circuit of production to the secondary 
circuit of the built environment (Harvey, 1978). Housing development, which accounts for a 
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significant proportion of the development of the built environment, hence plays a central role 
in capitalism. While the thesis of capital switching applies equally to virtually all capital 
investments in the built environment, housing development is arguably a special component. 
The meaningful construction of housing has significant and wide ranging implications in the 
restructuring of citizenship rights, welfare relationships, and political and socio-economic 
relations (Kemeny, 1992). Aalbers and Christophers (2014) centralize capital in housing and 
identify the multiple roles of housing when capital is considered from the perspective of each 
of its three modalities: capital as not only process of circulation but also social relation and 
ideology.  
The central role of housing development in capitalism and the variation of this role are also 
evidenced by empirical studies worldwide. For example, Haila (2000) argues that Hong Kong 
and Singapore are both “property states” where land rent is an important source of revenue 
and profit. Wu (2015) suggests an underlying linkage between housing market cycle and 
macroeconomic measures aimed at making housing a more “liquid” asset and an investment 
good, and assesses how housing commodification in China has been used to cope with the 
impact of financial crises and open up new opportunities to boost economic growth. Walk 
(2015) reveals how Canadian federal policies promoted residential mortgage securitization to 
save the banking sector during and after the 2008 global financial crisis.  
Furthermore, there has been summarizing consists of the elaboration of propositional 
principles. For example, Doling and Ronald (2014) outline an “East Asian housing model”, 
which features home ownership being promoted as a means contributing to national 
economic development objectives. Schwartz and Seabrooke (2008) coin the concept of 
“varieties of residential capitalism” to describe the distinct ways in which housing is being 
centralized in varieties of capitalism. Based on the simple variables of owner-occupation rate 
and mortgages as a share of GDP, they have developed four sophisticated residential 
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capitalist “ideal types” that each have a distinct set of housing politics: corporatist-market, 
liberal-Market, statist-developmentalist, and familial (Schwartz & Seabrooke, 2008). While 
this existing research has shed some light on why housing development plays a central role in 
capitalism and the variation in this role across places and over time, a significant gap here is 
that, why these variations exist is still unknown. 
 
1.2 The Case Study Country 
This research adopts a case study of housing development in post-war Japan to examine the 
logic of the centrality of housing development in capitalism. This section introduces Japanese 
capitalism and the country’s historical, political, and social context in broad terms. The 
purpose is to provide readers a first understanding on Japan’s post-war development. 
Japanese capitalism is widely regarded as distinct from its peers in the western developed 
world both politically and economically. The theory of the developmental state, firstly 
conceptualized by Johnson (1982), provides a useful starting point to understand Japanese 
capitalism. This theory is a political economy analysis of the phenomenon of state-led 
urbanization and industrialization in several East Asian countries, with Japan representing the 
leading exemplar of the developmental state capitalism (Johnson, 1982; Leftwich, 1995; 
Stubbs, 2009). The developmental state features a powerful state coordinating state-market 
relation and structuring resources to achieve developmental objectives, more specifically, 
economic growth. 
Developmentalism has been a persistent feature of the Japanese state throughout the post-war 
period. However, it is important to notice that the state is not static but evolves over time in 
response to the changing socio-economic circumstances. During the post-war period, the state 
has been heavily influenced by Keynesianism and neoliberalism, which are the two dominate 
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economic ideologies in the Western developed world since the Second World War. In the 
first thirty years of the post-war period when Keynesianism was prevailing, the Japanese state 
displayed a mix of developmentalism and Keynesianism, featuring by relatively egalitarian 
distribution of income and universal social protection through the welfare state. However, the 
Keynesianism social policies were inherently developmental as they ultimately aimed at 
contributing to the national developmental goals. From the 1980s, influenced by the spread of 
neoliberalism across the globe, the Japanese state experienced a neoliberal turn, manifesting 
by deregulation, decentralization, and more private capital’s participation in urban and 
economic development (Waley, 2007). However, the decentralization was indeed guided by 
the central government toward strategic state goals (Fujita, 2011; Hill, Park, & Saito, 2012; 
Tsukamoto, 2012). The state adopted neoliberal policy and political institutions while kept 
core developmental state traits. 
The social-economic transition in post-war Japan can be summarized from the perspective of 
the state responding to the changing domestic and international circumstances. In the first 
decade immediately after the War, facing the destruction of national economy and deficiency 
of funds and resources, the state prioritized production recovery but paid little attention on 
urban development and housing reconstruction. The purpose was to regain industrial 
productivity as soon as possible. After the recovery of production to the pre-war level, the 
following two decades of the mid-1950s to mid-1970s were featured by rapid economic 
growth and urbanization. The central government guided industrial development and 
dominated urban and housing development. The 1973 oil crisis severely hit the Japanese 
economy and marked the end of Japan’s rapid economic growth. Japan entered into a period 
of moderate economic growth. The state strived for expanding domestic demand through 
welfare provision and construction works to maintain economic growth. 
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With the spread of neoliberalism across the global from the early 1980s, the Japanese state 
gradually adopted neoliberalist ideas of decentralization and privatization. Due to concerns 
on the increasing governmental debt, the state cut social welfare provision. To stimulate 
domestic demand, it encouraged the private sector into housing and urban construction. Years 
of expansive economic policies ultimately led to the economic bubble in the late 1980s. The 
bubble burst in the early 1990s and Japan tripped into two “lost decades” characterizing by 
economic stagnation, unstable employment, and increased income inequity. The state further 
embraced neoliberalist ideas of decentralization and privatization to tackle with the sluggish 
economy. There has been more intensified participation of the private sector in urban and 
housing construction for economic stimulus. 
Although it seems impossible to trace the immense social-economic transition in post-war 
Japan in a few words, these major junctures offer insights on the logic of the transition of the 
state. The essence of the developmentalist ideology, namely the aspiration for economic 
growth, is almost unchanged but the concrete developmental strategies have been shaped by 
the changing social-economic circumstances and international economic ideologies.  
 
1.3 Housing Vacancy and the Japanese Case 
The case of housing development in Japan is worthy of attention for the high level of 
vacancies, which, as I will argue later, cannot be explained without considering the logic of 
the centrality of housing development in Japan’s capitalism. Throughout the post-war period, 
Japan has been experiencing a continuous increase in both vacant housing stock and national 
vacancy rate. In 2013, the vacant housing stock rose to 8.2 million and the vacancy rate 
reached 13.5% (Statistics Bureau of Japan, 2013b) (Figure 1). These numbers were incredible 
for an advanced capitalist country like Japan. A study of housing development in post-war 
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Japan should be attentive to such a severe vacant housing crisis. This section reviews existing 
discussions on the phenomenon of housing vacancy. The purpose is to situate Japan’s 
housing vacancy in a comparative context, showing how it differs from that occurring 
elsewhere. 
 
Figure 1: Housing stock, vacant housing stock, and vacant housing rate in post-war Japan 
Data Source: Chapter 21 Housing in Historical Statistics of Japan, Statistics Bureau of Japan (2012).  
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Rosen & Smith, 1983) or “structural vacancy” (e.g., Wheaton, 1990) in North American 
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transactional parties, the transactional system, and etc. (Couch & Cocks, 2013; Rosen & 
Smith, 1983).  
Empirical research suggests that the magnitude of the natural vacancy rate ranges from 1%-
5%. For example, Couch and Cocks (2013) argue that in the UK, nationally around 2.5% 
dwellings appear to be vacant due to market friction; Glock and Häussermann (2004) use the 
normal “mobility reserve” between 3% and 5% in the examination of the vacant housing 
issue in Eastern Germany. In the US, an often cited rule of thumb states that the vacancy rate 
in a well-functioning market is about 5% (Kingsley and Turner, 1993, p.10, cited in Hoekstra 
& Vakili‐Zad, 2011). Thalmann (2012) suggests that a vacancy rate of 1% -1.5% is 
sufficient for the Swiss housing market to be in equilibrium. The international comparison 
shows that Japan’s vacancy rate of over 13% is far beyond the normal “mobility reserve”.  
Existing understanding of housing vacancy is largely built upon economic theories, more 
specifically, the supply-demand relationship in a market. Most of this existing research treats 
housing as a market commodity of shelter and seeks to understand the cause of housing 
vacancy through tracing stock-flow chains of vacancy, analyzing the interaction of supply 
and demand factors, and examining the market adjustment process (e.g., Rosen & Smith, 
1983; Wheaton, 1990; White, 1971).  
Unfortunately, the approaches developed in existing studies, which are mainly from an 
economic perspective, are inapplicable for the case of Japan. In Japan, the increase of the 
vacancy rate has been coexisting with the increase of housing stock for decades (Figure 1), 
indicating that vacancies are directly generated by an oversupply of housing. Indeed, housing 
construction in post-war Japan has been staying at a high level, which has been averaged over 
1.4 million units annually from the mid-1970s (Figure 2). The unbalanced supply-demand 
relationship in Japan’s housing market is inconsistent with the general equilibrium theory in 
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mainstream economics. This theory contends that a single price will exist which brings 
demand and supply into equilibrium, while Japan’s housing market has shown a widening 
supply and demand imbalance for decades. 
 
Figure 2: Housing construction and vacancy rate in post-war Japan 
Data Source: Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism of Japan, Housing Construction 
Statistics of Japan (2016a). 
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However, the Japanese case differs from that in the typical shrinking cities. In 2013, the 
vacancy rate in Japan’s 47 prefectures ranged from 9.4% to 22.0% (Statistics Bureau of 
Japan, 2013b) (Figure 3). Despite the significant geographical variation in vacancy rates, a 
high vacancy rate was spreading nationwide. The fact indicates that a national-level 
mechanism of vacancy production exists. This mechanism must be different from that in the 
typical shrinking cities because it is unlikely that all Japanese cities can claim to be shrinking 
cities. 
 
 
Figure 3: Housing vacancy rate in Japan by prefectures in 2013 
Date Source: Housing and Land Survey of Japan 2013, Statistics Bureau of Japan 
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There has been substantial domestic discussions on the cause of the high vacancy rate. 
Reasons such as population ageing and population decline, financial hardship to rebuild or 
demolish dilapidated housing, and concerns on tax increase associated with turning vacant 
detached housing to vacant land have been raised frequently (e.g., Fukuda, 2013). These 
reasons do have some relations to housing vacancy but are just observation and experiences 
of events in the empirical world, rather the fundamental causal mechanism of vacancy 
production. The critical realism theory of science suggests that there is an ontological 
distinction between scientific laws and patterns of events; real structures exist independently 
of and are often out of phase with the actual patterns of events (Bhaskar, 2009). The “real 
structures” of vacancy production in Japan are yet to be uncovered. 
Japanese policy-makers at both the national and local level have noticed the vacant housing 
issue. Policy measures such as “Vacant Housing Reuse Project (akiya saisei nado suishin 
jigyo)” (The Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism of Japan, 2009) and 
“Vacant Housing Bank (akiya banku)” (e.g., Nikko City, 2014) were taken. However, these 
measures can hardly be regarded as useful since the vacant housing stock and vacancy rate 
are still increasing. 
Existing approaches to housing vacancy cannot explain the case of Japan. Few domestic 
discussions have provided convincing explanations on the underlying cause of the high 
vacancy rate. An insufficient understanding of the mechanism of vacancy production impedes 
effective policy making, hence this research also aims to build a better understanding of the 
cause of the phenomenon and thereby provide policy implications. 
 
1.4  Methodology: Political Economy and Historical Institutionalism 
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This section outlines some of the broad parameters of the thesis methodology whereas 
specific details are left to individual chapters. The research takes guidance from housing 
politics, political economy, and political science to examine the logic of the centrality of 
housing development in Japan’s capitalism. The primary empirical evidence is qualitative 
data from academic literature, government reports, meeting minutes, and policy documents 
detailing Japan’s post-war social and housing transition and quantitative housing and 
demographic data from the Statistics Bureau of Japan censuses and other surveys (e.g., 
Housing and Land Survey) conducted throughout the post-war period. 
Political economy believes that a self-regulated market never exists as it must be in classical 
economic theories, rather, the market is embedded in politics, religion, culture, and social 
relations (Polanyi, 1944). By employing a political economy perspective, this research 
assigns importance to the institutional context of the housing market in understanding 
housing production and consumption.  
Once accepted the “embeddedness” (Polanyi, 1944) of economy within the wider social and 
political context, it is important to notice that the context evolves over time. Here, the method 
of historical institutionalism is helpful for studying the continuities and changes of that 
institutional context across time. The concepts of critical junctures, path dependence, and 
fast-moving/slow-moving institutions in historical institutionalist analysis offer insights to 
institutional continuity and institutional change. 
Applying the framework of political economy and historical institutionalism to the case of 
housing development in post-war Japan, the research refers to the theory of the 
developmental state to understand Japan’s macro political economy and the concept of 
productive welfare capitalism to understand the role of housing development in the state. The 
research traces the evolution of Japan’s capitalist state and the change of the role housing 
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development played in the state. The interrelationship between the evolving of the state and 
the changing role of housing development over time sheds some light on the logic of the 
centrality of housing development in capitalism. The framework also enables to examine how 
the equilibrium in the housing market has been shaped by various social and political 
institutions, thus giving understanding on the mechanism of the accumulation of vacancies. 
Figure 4 shows the theoretical perspectives of the research. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 Theoretical Perspectives 
 
1.5 Thesis Overview 
Following this introduction, the thesis has six remaining chapters. The second chapter, titled 
“Political Economy and Housing” presents further theoretical and conceptual explanations on 
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institutionalism enables tracing how housing development has been centralized in the 
capitalist state over time and shedding some light on the logic of that process. 
Chapter Four, “Housing Development in Post-war Japan: A Political Economy and Historical 
Institutional Analysis Framework” applies the aforementioned conceptual framework to 
analyze the case of Japan. Referring to the theory of the developmental state and productive 
welfare capitalism, the chapter theoretically discusses the evolution of Japan’s post-war 
macro political economy and the change of the role housing development played in Japan’s 
capitalist state.  
Chapter Five, “Housing Development in Post-war Japan: An Empirical Analysis” provides 
empirical evidence for the theoretical discussion in the previous chapter. It examines the 
continuities and changes of the state, explores the change in the role housing development 
played and the evolution of housing policies, and explains the continuous increase in 
vacancies during the post-war period. 
Chapter Six, “The Vacancy Crisis, Policy Responses, and the Social Impact” identifies how 
the vacancy issue has been perceived in Japan, reviews current policy measures on housing 
vacancy, and analyzes why those policies failed to slow the increase of vacancies. Moreover, 
the discussion draws inspiration from the idea of housing as an asset-based welfare to explore 
the impact of housing oversupply and accumulation of vacancies to the household. 
The concluding chapter brings together the key findings in each chapter. It serves as a 
platform to relate the empirical findings to the broader conceptual themes introduced in this 
and subsequent chapters. The empirical conclusion accounts for the wider social implication 
of the phenomenon, policy suggestions, speculation on the future of Japanese housing, and 
what the rest of the world can learn from Japan. Conceptually, the research permits 
conclusions regarding the logic of the centrality of housing development in capitalism.  
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Chapter Two: Political Economy and Housing 
The term of political economy refers to a number of different things. Sometimes it was 
viewed as interdisciplinary studies of economics and politics in explaining the crucial role of 
political factors in determining economic outcomes, while it was also viewed as a 
methodological approach, which could be either an economic approach emphasizing 
individual rationality or a sociological approach emphasizing institutional analysis (Weingast 
& Wittman, 2008). This research uses political economy as a perspective to understand 
housing. It distinguishes such a perspective from the perspective of conventional economics. 
Unlike conventional economics that regard the economy as an isolated entity driven by its 
own set of rules based on the individual’s rational self-interest (Mackinnon & Cumbers, 
2007, p. 14), political economy views the market as socially constructed entities and insists 
upon the link between the economy and the society. A political economy approach situates 
the market within the broader social and political context. It assigns importance on the 
interplay between the economy and the relevant social institutions in determining economic 
outcomes. 
Polanyi (1944)’s view of the economy as an institutionalized process is helpful for explaining 
how the economy is related to the wider social and political context. According to Polanyi 
(1957, p. 243), the economy must be viewed as a process of interaction between man and his 
natural and social environment, because the meaning of economy in its most general sense 
“derives from a man’s dependence for his living upon nature and social environment” and 
such a process results in an ongoing supply of material to satisfy human needs. Polanyi 
(1944) coins the metaphor of “embeddedness”, meaning that the economy is embedded in 
social institutions, to describe the relation between the economy and the society. The 
institutional setting of the market includes not only formal institutions such as private and 
public organizations but more importantly tacit institutions such as individual habits, group 
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routines, and social norms and values that structure the social relations between individuals 
and help to generate the trust that underpin legal and contractual relationships (Amin, 1999). 
For Polanyi (1957), these social and political institutions regulate and sustain the well-
function of the market. 
But why a political economy perspective contributes to understanding housing? Bengtsson 
(2012, 2015) argues that the reason lies in the special mechanism of housing provision 
resulted from the dual character of housing. According to Bengtsson (2012, 2015), housing is 
at the same time an individual market commodity, which should as far as possible be 
distributed in accordance with individual consumer preferences; housing is also a public good 
demanding state involvement, which should ensure the politically defined housing needs can 
be fulfilled. In other words, market contracts serve as the main mechanism for distributing 
housing, while state correctives to the market can probably ensure that housing is affordable 
but could not distribute “standard” housing to every household. Due to the indirect role of the 
state and the involvement of various sectors at different levels in housing provision, the 
implementation of housing policy is not so much a matter of bureaucratic procedures but 
rather a “game” between these actors (Bengtsson, 2012). Such a special mechanism of 
housing provision implicates that the game between political actors is crucial in determining 
housing outcomes. 
Although Polanyi’s view of economy as an institutionalized process indicates that virtually 
every commodity is politically significant and every market needs its institutional setting, 
Bengtsson’s analysis of the special mechanism of housing provision shows that housing is 
probably of more political importance than other commodities and the market of housing 
diverges more from the so-called free market in the mainstream economics than that of other 
commodities. Housing is an item with high “institutional thickness” (Amin & Thrift, 1993) 
due to the various institutions involved in housing provision and the complexity of their 
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interactions. Such feature of housing reinforces the importance of understanding housing 
from a political economy perspective. 
Having accepted the importance of a political economy perspective on housing, the chapter 
clarifies some conceptual issues on this perspective on housing and vacancy. It begins by 
explaining what could be meant by a political economy perspective on housing. Then, the 
discussion extends to why such a perspective is important to examine housing vacancy and 
how to employ this perspective to study housing vacancy. 
 
2.1 Political Economy and the Housing Question 
Despite the importance of a political economy perspective on housing, there are not much 
research from this perspective, particularly when compares to the abundant literature on 
housing-as-policy and housing-as-market (Aalbers & Christophers, 2014). A discussion on 
the cause of the modest position of political economy in housing (see Bengtsson, 2009) lies 
beyond the scope of the thesis. I just simply state the fact. This section looks at some existing 
research examining the housing issue from a political economy perspective and identifies 
how this perspective on housing has been interpreted. 
A classical definition of political economy is that this term refers to the study of production 
and trade, and their relations to the wider social and economic context (Engels, 1877/2016). 
Housing is produced commodities of shelter that are being traded on the market (exclude a 
very small proportion of self-build housing). A traditional political economy perspective on 
housing thus focus on the production and trade of housing and their relations with social 
institutions. However, Aalbers and Christophers (2014) notice the social implications of 
housing which are beyond a commodity for trade and suggest a wider meaning of the 
political economy of housing. They argue that housing as a product of labour is only one 
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small dimension of its significance to capital circulation and expand the traditional view to 
build a broad sweep of the political economy of housing. They centralize “capital”, which is 
the core category of political economy, in housing and identify the multiple roles of housing 
when capital is considered from the perspective of each of its three modality of capital: 
capital as process of circulation, capital as social relation, and capital as ideology. 
Besides theoretical discussions, there has been a few empirical research on housing from a 
political economy perspective. For example, on the macro-level in which the state sets 
regulations for the national housing market, Walks (2014) examines how the Canadian 
housing and mortgage policies intervened to save its finance and real estate sectors after the 
financial crisis by state policies toward financial deregulation, lending standards, mortgage 
securitization, and etc.. Political factors are also evident on the micro level, in which housing 
consumers enter into the local housing market and deal with various private and public 
providers of housing. For example, Han and Wang (2003)’s study of the property market in 
Chongqing, China find that Chongqing’s property market was dominated by state 
intervention, since the local government not only set the rules and governing the process of 
housing development but also actively participated in the generation and sharing of benefits. 
Fields (2015)’s research examines how urban community organizations contend with 
financialization in their practice, and by attending to the dynamics of financialization in the 
rental market in order to preserve affordable rental housing in New York City. 
As shown in these empirical studies, owning to the distinct institutional settings of housing 
markets between places and over time, there were considerable variations in how housing 
enters the local political economy. Consequently, there were various ways to engage political 
economy with the housing question, depending on the political institutions being focused. But 
a common feature of this research is that, it places housing under the political-economic 
context, rather studies housing in isolation from the societal context.  
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2.2 A Political Economy Perspective on Housing Vacancy 
When considering the housing vacancy question, an unavoidable issue is the supply-demand 
relationship because vacant housing directly generates from the oversupply of housing. For 
the aforementioned embeddedness of the market in its social and political context and the 
special mechanism of housing provision, the supply-demand relationship of housing is far 
more complex than a classical market relation which is supposed to be adjusted by the 
invisible hand of the market. Rather, the relationship is shaped by the institutional context of 
the housing market. A political economy perspective on housing vacancy links housing to the 
social and political institutions of relevance to housing provision and consumption, and 
places importance on the actions and interactions of these institutions in shaping the supply-
demand relationship in the housing market. 
Under the background of the modest engagement of political science in housing studies, 
housing vacancy has seldom been examined from a political economy perspective. A 
relatively close study is Weber (2010, 2015)’s research on the overbuilding of commercial 
space in Chicago. She investigates how the local government crafted a redevelopment 
incentive - Tax Increment Financing to convert political control into fiscal strength and 
participate in the debt-fueled Millennial property boom (Weber, 2010). She further explores 
the role of the property developers and their interactions with other agents in the construction 
process, and shows how the circulation of capital is performed and emphasizes the process of 
“co-construction” to explain how supply and demand interact and combine in overbuilding 
(Weber, 2015). Weber (2010, 2015)’s research implicates that the oversupply of commercial 
space is not a pure market phenomenon because the local state’s financial instruments pushed 
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the build of new commercial space and consequently the old one was eliminated from the 
market. 
Due to the lack of research on housing vacancy from a political economy perspective, here I 
attempt to shed some light on the mechanism of vacancy production. The analysis is limited 
to long-term (non-frictional) vacancies, which means that short-term (frictional) vacancies 
generated from the market function for household mobility and speculative demand are 
excluded. The reasons is that as mentioned in the introduction chapter, different types of 
vacant housing generate through different mechanisms and thus should be addressed 
separately. Moreover, housing economists have already conducted a wealth of research on the 
production of frictional vacancies and speculations. These short-term vacancies, due to the 
much shorter time span of their formation and disappearance, are inclined to be affected more 
by market processes than institutional factors. 
Similar to the mechanism of housing provision which can only run through the market, 
although the supply-demand relationship of housing in the market is shaped by institutional 
factors, housing ultimately becomes vacant via a market filtering process. When the housing 
is no longer popular on the market, it becomes long-term vacant. Thus, long-term vacancies 
must have suffered a considerable decrease in market value. Now the key question turns to 
what has caused the depreciation of long-term vacancies.  
It is important to notice that when speaking of the value of a house, in most situations we are 
actually speaking of the inseparable value for both the physical house and the underlying 
land. The three important features of a property are “location, location, and location” on the 
grounds that the property can be altered but where it is cannot be changed (Jowsey, 2011, p. 
44). In other words, the value of housing is determined not so much by the value of the 
physical housing but dominantly by that of the underlying land. 
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Now it is clear that the drop in the marketability of long-term vacancies is largely due to the 
depreciation of the underlying land. The location of the land is no longer regarded as “great” 
on the market. The production of long-term vacancies thus includes a shift of hot spot and 
cold spot in the local housing market. The key to explain this process is to find out how the 
spatial structure of the local housing market has been shaped by institutional factors. 
 
2.3 Discussion 
The chapter discussed what a political economy perspective on housing and housing vacancy 
means. Such a perspective places housing under the wider social-political context and 
emphasizes the various social and political factors’ shaping of housing outcomes. Specifically 
speaking of housing vacancy, this perspective focus on how institutional factors shape the 
supply-demand relationship of the housing market. A detailed analysis of vacancy production 
indicates that a long-term oversupply of housing is resulted from the shaping of the spatial 
structure of the local housing market. 
A political economy perspective on a macro level explores how the actions and interactions 
of the state, market, and society shape housing provision and consumption, thus shedding 
some light on the centrality of housing development in capitalism. However, this perspective 
does enables explaining the role housing development plays centralized in each individual 
capitalist state but is insufficient to reveal the logic of that process. The next chapter 
integrates a historical institutionalist approach to the political economy perspective to address 
that question. 
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Chapter Three: Historical Institutionalism and Housing 
Once accepted the embeddedness of the economy within the social and political context, it is 
important to recognize that the context changes over time as society evolves. This chapter 
adds a historical institutionalist analysis to the political economy perspective. A historical 
institutionalist analysis enables tracing how housing has been centralized in the capitalist 
state over time, thus shedding some light on the logic of that process. Additionally, a 
historical dimension is also helpful for understanding housing vacancy. Due to on the “supply 
side” the longevity and physical sluggishness of the housing stock (Arnott, 1987; Stahl, 1985) 
and on the “demand side” the social importance of dwelling and the “attachment costs” 
(Dynarski, 1986) associated with a household’s transfer to another dwelling in another area, 
the supply and demand of housing change slowly. Hence it is worth examining housing 
vacancy from a historical perspective. 
North (1990, p. 3) defines institutions as constraints on behavior imposed by “the rules of the 
game” in society: “institutions include any form of constraint that human beings devise to 
shape human interaction.” This definition is very broad which includes not only substantive 
organizations (both governmental and non-governmental) but also non-substantive items such 
as ideology, social norms, cultures, and world values that shape actions in social, political, 
and economic processes. Institutionalists believes that institutions are relatively persistent 
features of the historical landscape and one of the central factors pushing historical 
development along a set of “paths” (Hall & Taylor, 1996). Institutional analysis understands 
sequences of social, political, and economic changes through examining the creation, 
persistence, and change of institutions across time. The chapter begins with explaining some 
essential ideas in institutional analyses. Then, the discussion looks at existing research 
adopting a historical institutional approach to housing. Finally, a framework for examining 
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the logic of the centrality of housing development in capitalism is built by integrating a 
political economy perspective to historical institutional approaches. 
 
3.1 Institutional Continuity and Institutional Change 
The most well-known idea in historical institutionalism may be “path dependence”, which is 
usually simplified into “history matters” where previous norms, institutions, or perceptions 
have survived over a long time (Sewell, 2005, pp. 101-102). But the empirical challenge is 
not to prove the assumption that history matters, which is probably always true as causal 
determinism suggests that every event is necessitated by antecedent events and conditions 
together with the laws of nature. What is important is to identify in what respect and via what 
type of mechanisms history matters under a certain context (Bengtsson & Ruonavaara, 2010). 
To address the above issue, institutionalists have developed systematic explanations on how 
institutions are created, continued, and changed in structured ways (e.g., Pierson, 2000; 
Roland, 2004; Thelen, 1999). Given the vast scholarship in this area, a comprehensive 
overview is impossible here. I only highlight the two concepts that will be applied to the case 
study later. 
The first concept is Roland (2004)’s typology of institutions. Roland argues that some sort of 
classification is important because in order to have a meaningful understanding of institutions 
as systems, one must have a conceptual framework to understand the interactions between the 
various institutions at work within that system. He distinguishes between “slow-moving” 
institutions (such as culture which akin to informal rules) and “fast-moving” institutions 
(such as political institutions which akin to formal rules) based on the capacity of institutions 
to change rapidly or slowly, and the patterns of institutional change in big steps or 
incremental. He describes political institutions as subject to rapid change in revolutionary 
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moments, while slow-moving institutions such as culture and social norms evolve slowly and 
continuously. He proposes to view institutional change as the interaction between slow-
moving institutions, culture in particular, and fast-moving institutions such as political and 
legal institutions. 
Another concept to be highlighted is critical junctures. Most historical institutional analyses 
have based upon a “punctuated equilibrium” model of change, which assumes that long 
periods of institutional continuity follows infrequent but dramatic institution-creating during 
short evolutionary periods, appearing back and forth (Capoccia & Kelemen, 2007). Critical 
junctures refer to the punctuation points in the “punctuated equilibrium” model. Junctures are 
“critical” because they place new institutional arrangements on new developmental pathways 
which are then difficult to alter (Pierson, 2004, p. 135). Critical junctures are triggered 
primarily by exogenous forces because such dramatic changes can rarely be produced by 
path-dependent existing institutions. Whether an exogenous force can trigger a critical 
juncture depends on the specific institutions and the context. Such a force can be a significant 
breakthrough in science and technology, a dramatic change in social and economic 
environment, or big incidence in natural environment. At these moments of contingency, old 
policies and understandings no longer work and new solutions need to be found (Katznelson, 
2003).  
 
3.2 Historical Institutional Approaches Toward Housing 
As the goal of most institutionalist research is to understand how institutions shape political 
outcomes, the relevant institutions and their specification should be specified for each study 
(Immergut, 1998). Applying institutional analysis to housing, firstly there raises the question 
of which institutions are the object of research. There exist numerous housing institutions, 
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which consist not only formally codified and collectively enforced sets of rules that have 
been developed to regulate the housing market, but also social norms and cultural values 
toward property right, home ownership, space, and family. 
Existing research adopting institutional approaches to housing has focused on a wide variety 
of housing institutions. In a historical comparison study between the divergent housing 
trajectories in Australia and the Netherlands, Lawson (2006) focuses on the historical and 
spatial definition of property rights, saving and investment, and on labour and welfare 
relations. Lowe (2004) analyzes the sometimes dramatic historical development of the British 
housing tenure structure during the 20th century and identifies that the key lies in some 
critical junctures and in particular the impact of the two world wars. The existing research is 
not restricted to the national level. Robertson, McIntosh, and Smyth (2010) use path 
dependence to examine why the social identity of particular neighbourhoods can be 
persistent. They investigate the over-80 year’s historic trajectories of three neighborhoods in 
the Scottish city of Stirling and identified the important role of class in determining social 
attitudes toward these areas and explained why their relative social positioning has not 
altered. Owning to the dense collection of institutions in housing, historical institutional 
approaches seem to be fruitful to housing studies. Particularly, these approaches are adept at 
comparative studies across countries and the explanation of housing transition in one country 
over time.  
 
3.3 A Political Economy and Historical Institutionalist Framework 
This research proposes a political economy and historical institutional framework to explore 
the logic of the centrality of housing development in capitalism. Such a framework enables 
examining the transition of the institutional foundation of the capitalist state and the 
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associated change of the role housing development plays in the state. Through tracing the 
change in the way housing development has been centralized in the state over time, 
identifying the continuities and changes, the framework enables sorting out some causal 
mechanisms of that process. 
Differing from the existing studies that focus directly on housing institutions as the object of 
institutional analysis, this framework marries institutional analysis indirectly. The reason to 
adopt such an indirect way is that, due to the important role of housing development in 
capitalism, housing policies are often subordinate to state policies. This framework 
understands the change in housing policies through considering the change in the institutional 
foundations of the state and the role housing development plays in the state. 
The institution to be examine in this framework is the institutional foundation of the capitalist 
state. It is important to notice that, the state is a system of institutions, not a single institution. 
Pempel (1998) creates the concept of regime, which he suggests can be thought of as being 
composed of three main elements: socioeconomic alliances, political-economic institutions, 
and a public policy profile. Inspired by Pempel (1998)’s idea, I suggest that the institutional 
foundation of the state consists of three different layers of institutions: ideologies, political-
economic institutions and their alliances, and a public policy profile. Ideology refers to 
shared ideas and beliefs which serve to justify the interests of dominant groups (Gramsci, 
1971). It legitimizes relations of power and resource distribution and produces the social 
norms in establishing political-economic institutions and making public policies. Political-
economic institutions include both governmental and non-governmental ones at different 
levels. They are driven by underlying ideologies. They participate or influence policy-making 
and implementing. A public policy profile refers to the concrete guidelines that regulate 
human action. 
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As there exists such a large cluster of institutions in the state, it is important to notice that 
different institutions change in different patterns. Ronald (2004)’s idea of fast-moving/slow-
moving institutions is helpful in understanding these differences. Crudely dividing up the 
institutions in the state, the ideological institutions are slow-moving institutions while 
political institutions and public policies are fast-moving institutions. Ideologies usually 
change slowly and incrementally while political institutions and public policies change 
dramatically and in big step. The concept of critical juncture is useful to analyze the change 
of those fast-moving institutions. The changes are usually triggered by crises and can be seen 
as the state’s response to new challenges. 
 
3.4 Discussion 
The chapter firstly introduced institutional analysis and explained how it can be used to study 
housing. Then, by integrating a political economy perspective and a historical institutionalist 
method, it established a theoretical framework to examine the logic of the centrality of 
housing development in capitalism. A political economy perspective relates housing to its 
wider social and political context. This perspective emphasizes considering what role housing 
development plays in the capitalist state to understand housing issues. A historical 
institutionalist analysis offers insights into the continuity and change of the institutional 
foundations of the state. This framework enables tracing the historical transition of the state 
and the role of housing development in it, thereby shedding light on the logic of the centrality 
of housing development in capitalism.  
Such an indirect way to apply institutional analysis to housing issues is justified by the 
political economy significance of housing. Due to the centrality of housing development in 
capitalism, housing policies are often subordinated to state policies. Thus, it is reasonable to 
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understand the change of housing policies through exploring the transition of the state and the 
associated change in the role housing development plays in the state. 
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Chapter Four: Housing Development in Post-war Japan: A Political Economy and 
Historical Institutional Analysis Framework 
The previous two chapters have established the theoretical framework of the research. This 
chapter and the following chapter apply the framework to the case of housing development in 
post-war Japan. These chapters trace the evolution of the institutional foundation of the state, 
the associated change in the role of housing development plays in the state and the 
institutional context of the housing market, and the mechanism of vacancy production in the 
housing market. This chapter builds the theoretical basis and the next chapter further offers 
empirical evidence. 
This chapter starts with explaining the Japanese model of capitalism based upon the theory of 
the developmental state. Then it places the housing sector under such a political context and 
explains the logic of Japan’s housing policies during the post-war period. After that, 
structured by concepts of critical junctures and fast-moving/slow-moving institutions in 
historical institutionalist analysis, the transition of the state and the role of the housing sector 
in the state are discussed. 
 
4.1 The Developmental State 
The theory of the developmental state is a good starting point to understand the Japanese 
model of capitalism. This theory is initially conceptualized to explain the phenomenon of 
economic miracle in several East Asian countries in the mid-late twentieth century (Johnson, 
1982). The developmental state literature contends that this phenomenon is best explained by 
the political feature of the state of these countries (e.g., Haggard, 1990; Johnson, 1982; Wade, 
1990). This feature is that, as Leftwich (1995, p. 401) defines, “ (having) concentrated 
sufficient power, autonomy, and capacity to shape, pursue, and encourage the achievement of 
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explicit developmental objectives”. Underlying the developmental state regime is the 
economic ideology of developmentalism, which believes that economic progress is best 
achieved when the state leads the nation in promoting economic change (Hill et al., 2012, p. 
5). 
Developmentalism and the developmental state are not manna from heaven. There have been 
various explanations on their origin. Gerschenkron (1962) recognizes the need for a state with 
developmental functions for late industrialized countries. He suggests that countries which 
were far behind the technological frontier of their day enjoyed a great advantage: they could 
simply imitate what had already proved successful elsewhere, without having to assume 
either the costs or the risks of innovating on their own; hence, the cooperation between state 
and major industries is crucial for maintaining stable macro economy in those countries 
(Gerschenkron, 1962). Johnson (1982, p. 25) contends that the developmental state arises 
from “a desire to assume full human status by taking part in an industrial civilization, 
participation in which alone enables a nation or an individual to compel others to treat it as an 
equal.” Doner, Ritchie, and Slater (2005) argue that the powerful states are developed to 
tackle the challenges of delivering side payments to restive popular sectors under conditions 
of extreme geopolitical insecurity and severe resource constraints. While a full exploration of 
the institutional genesis of developmentalism and the developmental state lies beyond the 
scope of this thesis, the existing literature suggests that the issue is related to the timing of 
industrialization, culture, and geography. 
Developmentalism, like other ideologies, exists in pure form only in the imagination (Hill et 
al., 2012, p. 8). The expression of developmentalism is consistently being shaped by the local 
situation. Hence, the geographical and historical expression of developmentalism is uneven, 
displaying differences in socioeconomic alliances and political-economic institutions locally 
and across time. During the post-war period, responding to the changing social economic 
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situations and international political ideologies, the Japanese developmental state has 
experienced immerse transition, which is explained later in this chapter. 
 
4.2 The Role of Housing in the Developmental State 
Since that the developmental state places highest priority on industrialization and economic 
development, its social policies are subordinated to economic objectives rather than serving 
as a right of citizenship. Holliday (2000) conceptualizes such type of welfare states as 
“productive welfare capitalism” as a supplement to Esping-Andersen (1990)’s comparative 
studies of welfare states. Esping-Andersen (1990) classifies welfares states based on the 
degree of decommodification in social policy and identifies three types: social democratic, 
conservative, and liberal. However, Holliday (2000) found that East Asian countries do not 
fall under this classification. Different from Esping-Andersen (1990)’s grouping which is 
articulated by protective intents, the welfare states in East Asia are articulated by their 
productive intents. A defining feature of such regimes is that the state “extends some social 
rights to productive elements of the population and thereby creates a kind of aristocracy of 
labour” (Holliday, 2000, p. 710). Under the category of “productive welfare capitalism”, 
Holliday (2000) further classifies Japan with South Korea and Taiwan as a “developmental-
universalist” productivist form of welfare capitalism, in which social policies are either 
sacrificed in favour of the needs of economic growth or developed to serve economic 
objectives. 
According to Holliday (2000)’s idea of productive welfare capitalism, social policies are 
generally “productive” in East Asian developmentalist countries. But owning to the speciality 
of housing as a component of the welfare state, housing often becomes a key field of state 
intervention for economic purposes. Housing studies scholars picture housing as the “wobbly 
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pillar” under the welfare state (Harloe, 2008; Torgersen, 1987) or as the “cornerstone” of the 
new welfare state (Lowe, 2004; Malpass, 2008). These apparently contradictory metaphors 
are all tenable because they are two different ways of thinking about the relationship between 
housing and welfare state (Malpass, 2008). The image of housing as the wobbly pillar derives 
from a conventional view of the welfare state as a set of public goods and services, of which 
housing is recognized as a special welfare state component. The dual character of housing as 
both a market commodity and a social welfare product as well as its nature of no fairly clear 
standard left the housing sector prone to be a residual welfare sector (Harloe, 2008, p. 2; 
Torgersen, 1987). The cornerstone image comes from that the expansion of home ownership 
could increase the economic capacity of households and potentially compensate for 
diminishing in other social welfare components (Ronald & Doling, 2012).  
The dual character of housing as a market commodity and a social welfare product, as well as 
the captive intense nature of housing has offered the developmental state immense 
opportunities to manipulate housing for economic purposes. In developmentalist countries, 
the housing sector contributes to economic growth mainly through playing the economic role 
and the social welfare role (Doling & Ronald, 2010; Ronald & Doling, 2012). On one hand, 
housing construction is pushed forward as a means of directly contributing to economic 
growth through motoring the construction industry and stimulating domestic demand. On the 
other hand, home ownership as an “asset-based welfare” (Doling & Ford, 2007; Torgersen, 
1987) increases the welfare capacity for families, thus offsetting the burden of the state for 
citizens’ well-being (Ronald & Doling, 2012; Ronald & Kyung, 2013). Kemeny (2005) 
vividly describes such an interchange as “the really big trade-off”. 
In summary, in developmentalist countries, the ideology of developmentalism assigns 
absolute primacy to national economic growth objectives. Under such a political context and 
also due to the special role of housing in the welfare state system, housing has been 
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aggressively manipulated to contribute to the developmentalist objectives through playing the 
economic role and the social welfare role. The proportion of these two roles are adjusted 
according to the changing social-economic situation, so as to maximum the housing sector’s 
performance in contributing to the developmentalist goals. 
 
4.3 The Evolution of the Japanese State and its Housing: Incremental Changes and 
Critical Junctures 
The Japanese state, similar to other states, is not static but evolves with the changing 
domestic and international circumstance. Here, the transition of the Japanese state is 
important because it implicates the change in the institutional foundation of the state and the 
associated change in the way housing was manipulated to contribute to economic growth. 
The section uses historical institutionalist analysis to understand the evolution of the 
institutional foundation of the Japanese state and the consequent change in the role of housing 
development in the state. 
The developmental state can be thought of as being composed of three layers of institutions: 
the ideological institution of developmentalism as the central tenet; a set of political-
economic institutions and their relationships at the middle level; and a public policy profile 
on the surface. These institutions evolve in different patterns and continuously interact with 
each other. Dividing up based on Roland (2004)’s idea of fast-moving/slow-moving 
institution, the ideology of developmentalism is a slow-moving institution, which changes 
slowly and incrementally; the social and political systems, policies, and regulations are fast-
moving institutions, which change in sharply and in big steps. 
During the post-war period, the Japanese state has been influenced by external economic 
ideologies and crises. Keynesianism and neoliberalism are the two most influential economic 
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ideologies that have dominated the capitalist world in terms of economic thinking, policy 
making, and even virtually every corner of the social-economic life in different historical 
periods after the Second World War. The influence of these two ideologies on the Japanese 
state was incremental but long-lasting. In contrast, the external crises urged the state turning 
sharply in a much shorter period of time.  
As mentioned before, at time of crises, institutions are more easily to change because the old 
institutions do not work and new institutions need to be found to tackle the new challenges. 
Hence, there are two blended threads of change in the Japanese state – the incremental 
influence caused by Keynesianism and neoliberalism and the sharp turns triggered by 
external crises. The following sections discuss how these external ideologies and crises have 
shaped the Japanese state and the role housing development played in the state. This chapter 
only outlines some of the broad parameters while specific details are left to the next chapter. 
 
4.3.1 The developmental state under Keynesianism 
During the first thirty years of Japan’s post-war period, Keynesianism constituted the 
dominant paradigm for understanding the determination of economic activity in the capitalist 
world. Keynesianism maintains that the level of economic activity is determined by the level 
of aggregate demand created by households, businesses, and the government (Blinder, 2008). 
Capitalist economies are subject to periodic weakness in the aggregate demand generation 
process, resulting in unemployment and economic crises. Under such an understanding of the 
mechanism of economic activity, monetary and fiscal policies are important because they can 
stabilize the demand generation process. Keynesian economists urge and justify a 
government’s intervention in the economy aiming to stimulate business activities, achieve 
full employment, and reduce deflation. 
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Influenced by Keynesianism, the Japanese developmental state showed some similarities to 
Keynesian states. The state policies heavily skewed to industrial policies of production and 
trade to generate social wealth. The regional policies redistributed wealth drawn from 
production and trade between tax-rich main metropolitan areas and relatively poor areas (Hill 
& Fujita, 2000). The unemployment rate was deliberately maintained low. Japan turned to a 
relatively egalitarian society. The majority of people perceived themselves as in the social 
mainstream. However, these policies was fundamentally aimed at national economic growth 
rather than the Keynesian social well-being. It is developmentalism that drove these 
Keynesian-like policies.  
The housing policies during this period showed some similarities to a Keynesian welfare 
state, as evidenced by the government-fostered home ownership through providing long-term, 
low-interest, and easily attainable housing mortgages. But unlike the housing sector as a 
prime beneficiary of government-induced economic growth under Keynesianism (e.g., 
Florida & Feldman, 1988), the Japanese housing sector was more like an industry 
infrastructure used to contribute to the developmental goal. The standard of the quality of 
housing was deliberately kept low so that housing could be provided at less cost. The housing 
policy system discriminated at rental housing and social housing (Hirayama, 2006).  
 
4.3.2 Neoliberalism and the neoliberal turn of the state 
From the late 1970s, the economic ideology that dominated the capitalist world started 
shifting from Keynesianism to neoliberalism. Such a shift happened under the background of 
signs of a serious crisis of capital accumulation and that Keynesian policies were no longer 
working (Harvey, 2005, p. 12). Neoliberalism proposes that human well-being can best be 
achieved by “liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional 
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framework characterised by private property rights, free markets and free trade” (Harvey, 
2005, p. 2). It opposes state interventions in social and economic affairs and applauds 
reliance on market mechanisms. 
Apparently, the tenet of neoliberalism exactly contradicts with developmentalism, which 
legitimates the dominate power of the state. Similar to the way in which Keynesianism was 
absorbed, the developmental state accepted the superficial form of neoliberalism while has 
kept the tenet of developmentalism. There has been a decentralization and deregulation of 
power and increased private sectors’ participation in social and economic activities but 
without the state necessarily losing the overall control. In the developmental state, 
neoliberalism is a “selective” liberalization of political economy (Hill et al., 2012). This 
process looks like the developmental state’s response to the new social economic order. The 
motivation was still to achieve the developmentalist goals to the maximum. 
Japan has been gradually adopted market-based reform measures from the 1980s and further 
embraced neoliberalism after the 1989 economic crisis, as evidenced by the privatization of 
public corporations, decentralization of power, expanded inequality among local 
governments, and increased unemployment rate and income inequality. However, the 
underlying ideology of these reforms decidedly differed from the western neoliberal states. 
Neoliberalism and its underlying market-rational individualism have never had real purchase 
as an ideological basis of government reform in Japan (Ohtake, 1999). State officials have 
promoted neoliberal reforms under the developmental rationale that freer markets are 
necessary for upgrading the national economy (Hill et al., 2012, p. 2). This rationale exactly 
followed the tenet of developmentalism. 
In Japan, deregulation and privatization of the housing system has been at the forefront of 
neoliberal prescriptions for socio-economic development (Forrest & Hirayama, 2009). The 
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government has been retreating from the direct provision of housing. Instead, the private 
sector has been increasingly participating in housing construction and provision. However, 
the private sector’s participation was strictly guided and governed by the state. These 
transformations showed the state’s strategies to use housing to boost economic growth under 
the neoliberal context. The purpose accords with the ultimate goal of economic growth in 
developmentalism. 
Keynesianism and neoliberalism affected the Japanese state in the same way. The state 
imitated the Keynesianism-like and neoliberalism-like policies while kept its own 
developmentalism. However, it is important to notice that the timing and depth of the 
influence of Keynesianism and neoliberalism to the state as well as its housing sector is 
related to crises. The following section explains how the state has been shaped by crises. 
 
4.3.3 Crises and the change of developmental pathways 
In a “punctuated equilibrium” model of the evolution of the Japanese state, crises mark the 
critical junctures when sharp turns happen. Hence here raises the question that which crises to 
be considered as critical junctures. Existing studies on Japan’s post-war political economy 
have generally agreed upon the most critical state regime shift is the one triggered by the 
1989 economic crisis (e.g., Fujita, 2011; Pempel, 1998), though most of these studies do not 
involve concepts in historical institutionalism. Here, I further include two other crises – the 
first oil crisis in 1973 and the global financial crisis in 2008. The reason is that I have 
observed changes in the way housing development contributed to economic growth after 
these crises. Although at a lower level of criticalness than the 1989 one, these crises are 
worthy of attention in this research. In addition, the end of the Second World War is arguably 
a critical juncture. The start of Japan’s rapid economic development period in mid-1950s is 
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also considered as a critical juncture because it was the time when the prototype of the 
Japanese state model was established and all later changes were based on this model.  
Immediately after the War, facing the desperate social and economic situation, the state 
prioritized rebuilding the lost industrial capacity. Limited fund and resources were almost 
fully injected to industrial development. Housing reconstruction was ignored because it was 
not the priority sector of industrial production. In the mid-1950s, when the industrial 
production recovered back to the pre-war level, the state established the institutional 
arrangements for the rapid economic growth. Japan’s postwar developmental state regime has 
the following characteristics: a stable political-bureaucratic elite run the state; relations 
between public and private sectors are guided by a planning agency; state income distribution 
is relatively egalitarian; and state economic intervention is based primarily on market 
incentives (Johnson, 1982). Under such a state regime, the state led mass housing 
construction and dominated the provision of housing mortgage. Housing was expected to 
contribute to economic growth through driving the construction industry and increasing 
social stability. 
The third critical juncture is the first oil crisis happened in 1973. The upsurge of the oil price 
interrupted the high-speed economic growth and trigged the industry restructuring from 
energy consumption to high-technology sectors. The state strived to maintain the level of 
economic growth through expanding social welfare and housing development became one of 
the key strategies. The state drove housing construction in the era without housing shortage. 
The last two critical junctures are the economic crisis happened in 1989 and 2008. 
Particularly, the 1989 economic crisis stands out as the most critical juncture in Japan’s post-
war history. The two crises were placed together because as Fujita (2011) argues, both of 
them were caused by global imbalance and pushed the state shifting to similar directions. 
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Under a neoliberal context, the state policy transformed toward a neoliberal-like tendency as 
evidenced by privatization, deregulation, and the accentuated market’s role. However, the 
developmentalist tenet remained. The motivation of the transformation was the aspiration for 
economic growth, not the liberal sprit. 
After the 1989 economic crisis, the state encouraged the private sector to engage in urban 
development for economic stimulus. New urban development projects were justified by 
literally responding to the social demand for better quality of life. After the 2008 crisis, the 
state continued to push ongoing shift further. The justification for continuous urban 
development further included the environmental issue and concerns on an aging society, 
which were emerging popular topics in the international world and domestic society 
respectively. Housing development as a major component of urban development was pushed 
forward. 
 
4.4 Discussion 
The chapter employed the political economy and historical institutionalist framework to 
analyze housing development in post-war Japan. It referred to the developmental state theory 
to understand Japan’s macro-political economy and the idea of productive welfare capitalism 
to understand the role of housing in the state. Two key concepts from historical 
institutionalism – critical junctures and fast-moving/slow-moving institutions were used to 
trace the evolution of the state in responding to the changing international economic 
ideologies and external crises during the post-war period. Two economic ideologies and five 
critical junctures were taken into consideration. The influences of Keynesianism and 
neoliberalism are more concerned with gradual but ultimately transformative processes. The 
five critical junctures – the end of the Second World War, the start of the high-speed 
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economic growth, the 1973 oil crisis, and the two economic crises in 1989 and 2008 
respectively triggered the sharp turns of political institutions and policies. 
In the post-war period, the Japanese state has experienced immense transitions, adapting to 
the changing social circumstances and external crises. The ideology of developmentalism, 
which aspires economic growth has continued, while the specific way to achieve that 
aspiration has experienced several sharp changes. Similarly, the principle of housing-for-
developmentalist goals has almost continued but the strategies to fulfill that principle has 
changed dramatically. These changes reflect the state’s switch of rational choice to maximize 
the housing sector’s contribution to economic growth when rapid change of social-economic 
situation happened. Still, the state’s choices were not purely rational but constrained by its 
culture and worldview. While this chapter has devoted to theoretical discussions, the next 
chapter further provides empirical evidence. 
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Chapter Five: Housing Development in Post-war Japan: An Empirical Analysis 
This chapter uses theory-guided narrative to provide empirical evidence on the evolution of 
the Japanese state, the consequent change in the role of housing within the state, and the 
transition of the institutional context of the housing market. The theoretical discussion in the 
previous chapter simplifies reality and drives the construction of the narrative. The narrative 
is assembled through a combination of governmental policies, planning documents, statistical 
surveys, and secondary sources. The flow of historical events is divided into five periods of 
continuity punctuated by the five critical junctures. The following three broad sets of research 
questions guide the narrative in each period. 
 What were the institutional arrangements for the state to achieve economic growth? 
 How housing was manipulated to contribute to the goal of economic growth and 
why such a manipulation was selected? 
 How the market mechanism of housing demand and supply was shaped? 
 
5.1 The End of the War to the Mid-1950s: Postponed Post-war Housing Recovery for 
the Priority of Industrial Recovery 
5.1.1 Post-war reconstruction: prioritize rebuilding the lost industrial capacity 
The Second World War had been devastating and cost Japan dearly in both human and 
material resources. Japan was in a desperate situation during the immediate post-war period. 
In 1945, the industrial capacity was approximately 10% of what it had been in 1930 
(Sorensen, 2002, p. 139). At the end of the War, most Japanese cities were smouldering ruins. 
The nation was facing extensive food shortages and many people were on the brink of 
starvation. More than one-sixth of the nation’s housing had been lost and homelessness were 
widespread (Dore, 1958, cited by Forrest, Kennett, and Izuhara, 2003). 
42 
The American-led occupation - General Headquarters (GHQ) governed Japan indirectly from 
the end of the War to 1952. The occupation aimed to democratize and decentralize Japan 
through reforming its political institutions, so that the totalitarian control and military 
aggression would be eliminated. However, the central governmental bureaucracy’s value and 
desire of centralization, which were slow-moving institutions, cannot be altered overnight. 
Through controlling finance, duties, and personnel, central officials retained their absolute 
power over local affairs (Allinson, 2004, p. 72). 
Under such a political context, the post-war reconstruction was essentially a central 
government-led activity. In order to rebuild the national economy in the most productive and 
efficient manner with scarce resources, the priority production program (Keisha seisan 
hoshiki) gave absolute priorities to the “priority sectors” of industrial development - electric 
power, coal, steel, and chemicals (Okazaki, 2001), which were assumed to have the capacity 
to promise quick returns and enhance the productive capacity of an economy. 
 
5.1.2 Housing recovery yields to industrial recovery 
Under the desperate social-economic situation in the immediate post-war period, housing 
reconstruction was obviously a heavy burden. The central government, who strived to 
prioritize rebuilding the national economy, showed a negative attitude toward housing 
recovery. Under the democratizing of Japan’s economic institutions run by the GHQ, 
cooperation mainly funded by the government was given orders to be closed. The Housing 
Corporation (HC) (Jutaku eidan) was no exception. The HC was a private-public partnership 
cooperation that had provided mass housing during the War time. It was established in 1941 
with the adoption of business from Dojunkai - a foundation established and funded by the 
Home Ministry aiming at providing mass housing in the pre-war period (Kuroishi, 2014). The 
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GHQ’s command to close the HC was not non-negotiable as housing was an important 
necessity for the public, but the central government had no petition for that command 
(Ohmoto, 2005). Moreover, according to the meetings minutes of the construction committee 
of the House of Representatives in 1949, the construction committee suggested to exempt the 
HC from closing but the Ministry of Finance declined the request because of “financial 
difficulties” (Ohmoto, 2005). Finally, the HC was closed in 1951.  
The central government had no clear vision on housing recovery and acted passively. 
“Financial difficulties” was only an excuse for the delayed housing recovery. The 
fundamental reason was the central government’s desire to recover industrial development as 
soon as possible. During the post-war economic recovery period, housing construction was 
limited to the building of emergency shelters and workers’ housing, which were essentially a 
component of the industrial recovery. Despite serve housing shortage and the spread of 
homelessness, housing construction for the general public was ignored. The pre-war 
industrial production had regained by 1953 but severe housing shortage remained. The 
vacancy rate was as low as 1.3% in urban areas in 1953 (Statistics Bureau of Japan, 2012). 
The speed of production recovery sharply contrasted to that of housing recovery.  
 
5.2 The Mid-1950s to 1973: Rapid Mass Housing Construction for Urban Workforces 
during the High-speed Economic Growth Period 
5.2.1 Strain every nerve to boost economic growth 
Recovery from the War was followed by a nearly 20-year high-speed economic growth. From 
the mid-1950s to 1973, Japan’s economy developed at a striking pace with the average 
annual GDP growth reaching as high as approximately 10%. The economic miracle cannot be 
explained without referring to Japan’s economic bureaucracy (Johnson, 1982). The political 
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configuration that enabled the high-speed economic growth - as summarized by Johnson 
(1982) – primarily consisted the following elements: governmental officials unilaterally 
devised social and economic goals, state policies targeted at specific industries that deemed 
critical to economic growth and international competitiveness, and growth achieved through 
manufacturing production and export. 
This growth model was financed through a centralized financial system governed by the 
banking bureau of the Ministry of Finance (MoF), which controlled the Bank of Japan and 
the banking sector (Aoki, 2001). Guided by the MoF, money flowed from household savings 
in post offices and other financial institutions into state institutions, and then channeled into 
borrowing firms in specified “strategic” industries through a small number of main banks 
operating under the administrative guidance of the MoF and the Bank of Japan (Aoki, 2001). 
In this way, the capital accumulation to sustain the high-speed economic growth was 
achieved through low-cost domestic debt. However, underlying such financial strategies were 
the expropriation of households’ savings and the suppression of consumption, a meagre 
resource allocation for the urban environment, and little expenditure on social capital and 
welfare (Fujita, 2000; Nagamine, 1986; Sorensen, 2002). 
Although the provision of welfare services reduced the capital available for industrial 
development, the state recognized that to some degree, providing social welfare was 
indispensable for the high-speed economic growth. The “Income Doubling Plan” (Shotoku 
baizo keikaku) formulated by the Cabinet Office in 1960 declared that “social welfare is the 
driving force of economic development; establishing a welfare state by expanding social 
welfare institutions is the foundation for the development of liberal economic institutions” 
(Economic Planning Agency, 1960, p. 97 ). During the high-speed economic growth period, 
social policies were expected to contribute to economic growth through playing both the 
economic role and the social welfare role. Providing welfare services contributed to domestic 
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demand growth while also indirectly to social stability, which was a foundation for the high-
speed economic growth. 
 
5.2.2 Housing development for social stability 
From the beginning of the 1950s, the central government enacted housing policies to set up 
post-war housing reconstruction. The so-called “three pillars” of post-war housing policy 
were systematized by: the Government Housing Loan Corporation (GHLC) Act of 1950, the 
Public Housing Act of 1951 and the Japan Housing Corporation (JHC) Act of 1955. The 
following explains how these “three pillars” spoke out the government’s intention of using 
housing development to drive economic growth. 
The GHLC, established under the GHLC Act, was fully funded by the government. It 
primarily concerned with providing long-term, low-interest, and easily attainable mortgages 
for the acquisition or construction of housing. Before 1965, the availability of housing 
mortgage finance was restricted to public sources through the GHLC. Banks were not 
allowed to lend money for housing mortgage loan, so that housing would not compete with 
industries for capital. Meanwhile, the private financial sector was unwilling to provide long-
term mortgage for the high risk of interest rate rise during the high-speed economic growth 
period. The GHLC thus became the dominant source of housing mortgage loan. 
The Public Housing Act of 1951 aimed to provide low-rent housing for low-income 
households. Under the Act, public housing was subsidized by the central government and 
constructed, owned, and managed by local governments. However, direct provision of rental 
housing by the public sector has been positioned as a residual measure. Little assistance for 
the construction of private rental housing and absolutely no rental subsidies existed. The ratio 
of public housing was kept at as low as approximately 7% (Hirayama, 2006, p. 19). 
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Furthermore, an obvious disparity in the physical condition of housing between the owner-
occupied sector and the rental sector existed. It was next to impossible to obtain a good 
quality dwelling in the rental housing market. The Public Housing Act essentially encouraged 
home ownership rather than supported low-income household for renting housing. 
The JHC, founded under the JHC Act, aimed to supply housing in large volume in 
metropolitan regions. Japan’s urbanization was featured by the rapid growth of its three 
principal metropolitan regions of Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagoya. During the rapid economic 
growth period, the population of the three metropolitan regions increased rapidly and has 
exceeded 45% of Japan’s national population from 1970 (Statistics Bureau of Japan, 2013a). 
Due to the huge influx of migrants, housing shortage was particularly severe in metropolitan 
regions. The JHC lead housing construction in the form of danchi, which means multi-storey 
apartment buildings. It was at the first time that apartment buildings were constructed on a 
large scale in Japan. Obviously, building apartments is much cheaper than building the same 
amount of single-detached housing. The most typical layout of apartment building was the 
so-called “2DK”, which means two bedrooms, one dining room, and one kitchen, with a total 
area of only approximately 35m2 (Ronald, 2009, p. 562). Building such small apartments 
enabled the JHC to address the issue of housing shortage at a lower cost and with less time. 
Later on, the JHC developed new towns, which consisted of not only housing blocks but also 
matched living facilities and infrastructures. The new towns were generally located at 
suburban metropolitan areas where land was much cheaper and more easily attainable than 
that in inner cities. Those new towns were purely giant bedroom towns for the working class 
who commuted long hours to work in inner cities. The JHC had never attempted to balance 
the job-housing ratio and turn the new towns to self-sufficient cities. The reason is obvious. 
Building suburban dormitories were much easier and faster than building self-sufficient 
cities. The aspiration to maintain the speed of economic growth did not allow more time and 
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fund for housing provision. Sorensen (2002, p. 185) comments that these housing projects 
resembled more an emergency shelter programme for refugees than a careful city planning 
programme. 
During the high-speed economic growth period, housing played a mix of economic role and 
social welfare role. On one hand, mass construction of housing was a strong driver of the 
construction industry. On the other hand, the housing policy system, which encouraged home 
ownership through the provision of GHLC loans while discriminated at rental housing and 
subsidized housing, played an important role to foster social stability (Hirayama, 2006, 
2007). The land and housing prices rose much more rapidly than income and consumer 
prices, indicating that owner-occupied housing could generate considerable capital gains for 
the owner. Owner-occupied housing was regarded as an effective form of asset accumulation, 
which can offset dependence on public welfare, improve household economic stability, 
secure the household’s livelihood in their old age, and enhance wealth exchange across 
generations (Hirayama, 2006, p. 21; Ronald & Nakano, 2013, p. 454). Hence, home 
ownership and the expectation for it had contributed to increase social stability (Hirayama, 
2006; Ronald, 2004). The strong social stability was evidenced by the popular phrase 
“Ichioku so churyu”, which means that all 100 million of the national population tagged 
themselves as the middle-class. 
Under the absolute priority for economic growth, housing policies were developed to sustain 
the growth of the national economy rather than improve residential quality of life. The 
housing policies were successful in a sense that the state’s intention was achieved. The home 
ownership rate raised to around 60% in the late 1960s (Statistics Bureau of Japan, 2011). By 
the early 1970s, housing stocks exceeded the number of households in each part of the 
country (Oizumi, 2007). The national vacancy rate raised to 5.5% in 1973, which seemed to 
be a number approximate to or slightly above the market equilibrium level. The issue of 
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housing storage became a past and Japan turned to a home ownership society. However, such 
a housing policy system and housing provision model were grounded on the increase of land 
and housing price and continuous economic growth. Later historical periods have witnessed 
the collapse of this system and the transformations of the role housing played in the state. 
 
5.3 1973 to the Late-1980s: Housing Construction to Expand Domestic Demand during 
Moderate Economic Growth Period 
5.3.1 Increase domestic demand by construction and the expansion of social welfare 
In 1973, the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) suddenly began to raise 
the oil price. By 1974, the oil prices quadrupled. Japan, a country with scarce natural 
resources, was hard hit as it almost wholly depended on imported oil for its energy supplies. 
The crisis urged Japan’s industrial structure shifting from the old growth sectors of heavy and 
chemical industries to the new growth sectors of precision machinery, electronics, 
automobiles, and finance (Sorensen, 2002, p. 259). The structural shift of the Japanese 
economy had obvious effects on maintaining the speed of economic growth. After a sharp but 
brief decline immediately following the crisis, Japan’s economic growth resumed and its 
relatively outstanding economic performance maintained. The average GDP growth rate was 
5% in the 1970s and 4% in the 1980s, which was unparalleled in the developed world. The 
crisis marked the end of the era of Japan’s high-speed economic growth and a period of 
moderate economic growth began. 
The 1973 oil crisis also aroused debates on the rationality of state welfare. After years of 
welfare expansion during the high-speed economic growth period, Japan established an 
enriched social welfare system. The year of 1973 was even declared by the Cabinet Office as 
the “First Year of the Welfare State Era” (Fukushi gannen). However, the existence of the 
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new welfare era was soon challenged by the oil crisis. The sudden slowdown of economic 
growth caused the decline of tax revenue and thus brought huge fiscal difficulties to sustain 
the welfare system. There had been debates on reforming the social welfare system. But the 
reform did not happen until the late 1970s due to a number of reasons including the influence 
of the post-war Keynesianism and political pressures (Tata, 2007, cited by Tanaka, 2009). 
Welfare spending thus expanded greatly during the 1970s and the overall government debt 
levels increased dramatically. To some degree, the expanded provision of welfare services 
contributed to economic growth in the 1970s through boosting domestic demand. 
By the late 1970s when the political pressure for social welfare reform was alleviated, also 
due to the growing concern on the scale of the public sector deficit and inspirations from 
Thatcher and Reagan’s neoliberal policies, the Economic Planning Agency published “Social 
and Economic Seven Years Plan” (Shin keizai shakai 7-kanen keikaku). The plan proposed to 
build a “Japanese style welfare society” through revitalizing the traditional Japanese spirit 
and practice of mutual help and emphasizing the role of individuals, family, and local 
communities in providing social welfare. Such a welfare approach showed a transition from a 
Keynesian welfare state to a neoliberal one. The traditional Japanese spirit was borrowed as 
to justify the new social welfare system to the public. 
The idea of a Japanese style welfare society was implemented from the beginning of the 
1980s. The reform of the social welfare system was along with a series of policies to restore 
governmental finance. The new government led by the new Prime Minister Nakasone 
initiated the so-called “administration reform” (Gyosei kaikaku), including reform of 
insurance and pension arrangements, reduction of the size of the government, curtailment of 
public expenditure, and etc.. The measures included policies of deregulation, revitalizing the 
private sector, and privatizing national monopolies. 
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The administration reform policies cut governmental budget but meanwhile contributed to the 
soaring trade surplus. From the mid-1980s, Japan’s huge and constantly growing trade 
surpluses had been receiving increasing pressures from the international world. The 
government had to promise to cut its trade surpluses through a two-fold response - increase 
import and boost domestic demand. In the Comprehensive Economic Policies (Sougou keizai 
taisaku) published by the Cabinet in April 1986, the major remedy for trade friction was 
identified as using private sector resources to stimulate growth in domestic consumption 
mainly through public works, housing, and construction (Ministerial Council on Economic 
Measures of Japan, 1986). Since that the increase of public works would meanwhile increase 
governmental financial burden, the government heavily emphasized urban and housing 
development as the remedy for the trade friction. The government stressed on deregulation 
and relaxation of planning controls to promote more intensified urban development. 
The measures to stimulate domestic demand together with the administration reform have 
complemented the developmental industry’s push to restore profitability (Hebbert & Nakai, 
1988) and thus contributed to the continued economic growth in the 1980s. However, these 
measures was arguably unsustainable. The latter half of 1987 witnessed the development of 
Japan’s bubble economy with an abnormal upsurge in stock and asset values fuelled by 
expansionary monetary policies, financial deregulation, the low cost of borrowing, and other 
factors. 
 
5.3.2 Continued housing development to expand domestic demand 
Although national housing demand was met by the early 1970s when number of dwelling 
exceeded the number of household in each part of the country, housing construction remained 
at a high level because housing was chosen as a means to spur domestic demand and absorb 
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surplus capital. Housing has the capacity to quickly and easily boost domestic demand. 
Further consumption growth through refining and updating the product is constrained by the 
rate of technological innovation and uncontrollable, while improving housing, which is 
essential containers for consumer durables and has strong ripple effects into related 
industries, is the key strategic variable in stimulating domestic demand (Hebbert & Nakai, 
1988). Particularly, as Japanese housing was notable smaller and in lower quality than any 
other countries with comparable living standards, policies on housing improvement can easily 
be justified to the public. 
From the Third Five-year Housing Construction Plan (Daisanki jutaku kensetsu kanen 
keikaku) implemented in 1976, the government shifted the aim of housing construction from 
“securing the amount to improve the quality” (MLIT, 2005a). Such a shift showed good 
reasoning at first glance because the problem of housing shortage was already solved. 
However, the government’s statement was essentially an excuse to justify continuous housing 
construction in the era of no housing shortage. The government’s effort to improve the 
quality of housing was not through improving the existing low-quality housing but through 
building more new housing, though in better quality than the existing one. The old low-
quality housing was still there with households living in. Even worse, the continuous 
construction of new housing lowered the relative market value of existing low-quality 
housing. Households living in the existing housing unavoidably suffered from capital losses. 
From the 1970s, the state sought to encourage housing construction and acquisition of home 
ownership through expanding housing welfare. The government expanded the GHLC loans, 
placing more stress on encouraging acquiring home ownership with the GHLC mortgages. 
The GHLC launched a series of new loan systems. For example, the step-repayment system, 
in which the amount of repayments was lowered during the first five years, started in 1979. A 
two-generational loan system, in which children can take over their parents’ mortgage, was 
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established in 1980. The provision of supplementary loans in addition to basic loans began in 
1985. Among the new starts in owner-occupied housing, the average percentage of GHLC-
financed housing, which was 18.8% in the 1960s, rose to 25.6% in the 1970s, and to 47.6% in 
the 1980s, and then to 49.3% in the 1990s (Hirayama, 2010a). 
From the early 1980s, affected by the gradual shift of the international economic ideology 
from Keynesianism to neoliberalism and the international pressure of surplus trade and 
governmental fiscal difficulties, there had been a privatization of public-sector real estate. In 
1981, the JHC was reorganized to the Housing and Urban Development Corporation 
(HUDC), gradually retreating from directly constructing housing and turning to guide the 
private sector’s housing development. To further encourage private investors engaging in 
housing construction, the government initiated planning deregulation to make urban 
development/redevelopment more profitable. Within urban areas, deregulation of planning 
control was realized mainly by increasing permitted plot ratios. While in urban fringes, which 
were the main target of planning degranulation, the central government’s policies made it 
easier for the local government to interconvert the two fundamental zoning categories - 
“Urbanization Control Areas” and “Urbanization Promotion Area”, so as to allow more and 
more urban development (Hebbert & Nakai, 1988). 
Overbuilding and speculative investment were the main feature of Japan’s housing market in 
the 1970s and the 1980s. The residential land price rose over 280% between 1985 and 1990 
(MLIT, 2016b). The national vacancy rate ran up to 9.4% in 1988. In terms of spatial effects, 
the excessive construction pushed forward suburban sprawl. Take the Tokyo Metropolitan 
Area (TMA) for example, in 1960-65 the 20-30 kilometre band had the fastest growth rate, 
then in 1965-75 this passed to the 30-40 kilometre band, in 1975-80 to the 40-50 kilometre 
band, and in 1985-1990 to the 50-60 kilometre band (Sorensen, 2002, p. 206). As the TMA is 
a mono-centric metropolitan region from a macroscopic point of view, such a scale and speed 
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of sprawl was incredible. Considering that the five-year rate of population growth rate in 
TMA fell to 6.13% during 1975-1980 and further to below 6% during the 1980s (Statistics 
Bureau of Japan, 2013a) along with the slowdown of economic growth, the aggressive 
housing construction under conditions of inelastic land supply and loose planning control can 
easily be imagined. 
 
5.4 The Early-1990s to 2008: Housing Construction for Economic Revitalization in the 
“Lost Decade” 
5.4.1 Stimulate economic revitalization by turning to innovation and services 
The bubble economy collapsed at the beginning of the 1990s and marked the sharpest social, 
political, and economic turn in post-war Japan. The 1990s is often referred as Japan’s “lost 
decade” for the prolonged deep recession characterized by minimal or even negative real 
growth in GDP, rising unemployment rates, and reduced real incomes. On one hand, the 
economic crisis triggered the political crisis toward the discrediting of the government and 
has led to widespread appeals for a more radical decentralization (Sorensen, 2002, p. 288). 
On the other hand, the central government had been controlling the local government through 
redistributing tax. But its redistribution ability decreased rapid due in part to declining tax 
revenues and also the significantly increased spending on economic pump-priming efforts 
(Sorensen, 2002, p. 288). In addition, the Japanese people, who suffered from inflated 
housing and commodity costs and poor public services during the bubble economy, were 
deeply dissatisfied with the developmental policies emphasizing production and trade at the 
expense of better quality public goods and services (Fujita, 2011; Sorensen, 2002, p. 289). 
They turned to call for a better quality of life. 
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The financial and political pressures pushed the central government to decentralize and gear 
the goal from economic growth to quality of life. However, the ideology of 
developmentalism, which is a slow-moving institution, cannot be changed overnight. The 
interaction of the slow-moving institution of developmentalism and the fast-moving 
institutions of policies drove state policy change toward ostensibly decentralized and 
pursuing for better quality of life but the fundamental aspiration of economic growth 
remained.  
From the 1990s, the central government led policy changes from production and trade to 
innovation and services (Council on Science and Technology Policy, 2001). It emphasized 
innovation in science and technology in areas such as nanotechnology, medical, information, 
and environment, as well as services in health and welfare. The central government literally 
emphasized better quality of life in responding to public sentiment by increasing welfare in 
health and services, spending on public works, and boosting housing and urban development. 
The purpose behind was to restart economic growth. 
 
5.4.2 Continued housing development for economic recovery 
For economic stimulus, the central government further pushed housing policies toward the 
mass construction of owner-occupied housing and encouraged the acquisition of home 
ownership. The government’s measures were particularly worthy of attention because 
continued housing construction was boost in the era with an already high vacancy rate of 
approximately 10%. Furthermore, after the bubble, the housing price has been declining 
constantly and hence housing was no longer being perceived as a perpetual asset worthy for 
investment. At first sight, it seems impossible to drive housing construction under such a 
housing market condition. But the central government made it possible. The housing policies 
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discriminated at old housing while encouraged acquiring new housing. As the investment 
value of housing no longer existed, the use value of housing was emphasized. 
Geography was the key for the government to achieve its purposes. In contrast to the 
suburban housing development before the bubble economy, the 1990s onwards had witnessed 
the hot spot of the regional housing market shifting from the suburb to the inner city. The 
government created such a shift to reduce the marketability of old housing, which was largely 
located in the suburb, and increase the marketability of the new housing, which was largely 
newly constructed in the inner city. The institutional measure included revisions of planning 
regulation, advertisements for a new residential life of living in the city center, and financial 
incentives. 
From the mid-1990s, the method to calculate building height and floor area ratio (FAR) were 
gradually changed, suddenly allowing much larger buildings to be built on given sites. 
Furthermore, a more aggressive way to weaken the regulatory restrictions was the 
designation of special zones, which were exempted from restrictions on building height and 
FAR. For example, the “Cityscape-guide Districts Planning System” (Machinami yudogata 
chiku keikaku) was implemented from 1996, specifying that local municipal and stakeholders 
can negotiate and decide what can be built. The “High-rise Residential Building Promotion 
District” (Koso jukyo yudo chiku) System was implemented from 1998. In the designated 
special zones, if residential land use was no less than two thirds, a re-designated FAR ration 
can reach 400% to 500% (MLIT, 2005b). In 2002, the government moved further by 
initiating the “Urban Renaissance” (Toshi saisei) policy. In the designated zones, the private 
developer can even propose its own plan for construction without considering the current 
restrictions. 
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The relaxation of planning regulations was justified by and associated with promoting the 
novel lifestyle of “living in the city center” (Toshin kyoju), which differed from the suburban 
lifestyle prevailing in the high-speed economic growth period. “Living in the city center” was 
described as a charming lifestyle with numerous merits such as much less commuting time, 
convenient living facilities within walking distance, safer residential environment, so that it 
could bring a better quality of life (MLIT, 2003). However, the underlying purpose was to 
direct people to the city centre and thereby increase the marketability of the new housing 
there, rather bring a better quality of life to people. 
Housing finance policies also accelerated further housing construction. There was a sharp 
relaxation in housing mortgage in the 1990s. After the bubble, the Japanese bank set a 
historically low interest rate, thus enabled the private financial institutions providing housing 
loans with low interest rate. During 1993-1994, the mortgage rate reached a historically low 
number of 4%. In 1995, the rate further decreased to 3.75%. Importantly, the mortgage 
discriminated at old housing while favored new housing. For example, while the longest 
repayment period for a GHLC loan was generally 35 years for new housing, the number was 
only 25 years for second-hand housing; Furthermore, the GHLC did not finance the purchase 
of housing over 25 years old (Hirayama, 2005). The tax deduction system also discriminated 
at old housing. Purchasing housing older than 20 years old cannot receive tax deduction. 
Institutional measures as mentioned above led to the significant difference in marketability 
between old housing and new housing. Hirayama (2005) observes a much server housing 
price decline in the suburb than that in the inner city after the bubble economy. In the era of 
slow or even negative growth, regional development was like a zero-sum game. Revitalizing 
the inner city inevitably led to the decline of the suburb. Even worse, many of the suburban 
cities were essentially residential towns without industrial foundations. The decline of the 
local housing market was a great blow to these areas. It accelerated population ageing and 
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decline in the area and led to a chain effect of the close of shops, hospitals, schools, and other 
living facilities. Although the local municipalities have been trying to develop industries and 
revitalize their cities, without financial supports from the central government, what they can 
do was extremely limited. The local residents have to suffer an increasingly inconvenient 
daily life, the deterioration of the residential environment, a continuous depreciation of their 
housing property, and more. Obviously, the central government’s commitment to increase the 
quality of life was symbolical. The ideology of developmentalism has seldom been changed. 
The institutional measures shifting the spatial structure of the regional housing market were 
aligned with the influence of neoliberalism. From the 1990s, the housing system has been 
radically reorganized toward privatization and deregulation. The “three pillars” of the post-
war housing system – the GHLC Act, the JHC Act, and the Public Housing Act no longer 
exist. The GHLC, which had been a central instrument in expanding middle-class home 
ownership, was undergoing reform and ultimately abolished in 2007 mainly because of the 
huge financial burden for the government. The Housing Finance Agency was established as 
the successor to the GHLC, however, the successor withdrew from the primary mortgage 
market and thereafter only dealt with the secondary market of mortgage securities. The rapid 
expansion of mortgages that private banks supplied filled the large void in the housing loan 
market after the abolition of the GHLC. However, unlike the GHLC that provided all 
borrowers with mortgages under relatively homogeneous conditions in terms of interest rates, 
loan limits, and guarantee fees, private banks discriminated at borrowers (Hirayama, 2014). 
This has increased the difficulties, burden, and risk for lower-income households to acquire 
housing loans. The HUDC, which was the successor of the JHC, was reorganized into the 
Urban Development Corporation in 1999, and again into the Urban Renaissance Agency 
(URA) in 2004. Instead of undertaking housing provision and urban development by itself, 
the URA’s role was limited to supporting redevelopment projects carried out by the private 
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sector. In the revision of the Public Housing Law in 1996, the upper income limit for tenants 
of public housing was lowered. Simultaneously, the government curtailed the subsidies for 
the construction of public housing (Oizumi, 2007, p. 49). The public housing was further 
residualized in Japan’s housing system. 
The neoliberal turn of Japan’s housing system showed increased engagements of the private 
sector in providing housing and mortgage. However, the motivation behind was to stimulate 
economic growth, rather the neoliberal ideology of laissez-faire. The central government 
maintained control over the local housing market through institution measures including 
planning regulations, public opinion leadership, and housing finance policies. These 
responses can be understood as the developmental strategies under the economic and political 
context of neoliberalism and the decreased central government’s direct control power over 
local affairs during the economic recession. 
Despite the fact that Japan experienced its worst and most prolonged recession in the 1990s 
and 2000s, the Japanese large cities have seen an extraordinary boom of high-rise residential 
development in the city center and along major transit corridors. The boom was driven by 
governmental policies and consequently led to the rise of vacancy rate in the suburb. The 
vacancy rate in remote and small cities has also been increasing due to the continuous 
population outflow to large cities. The increase of vacancy rate in both large and small cites 
contributed to the national vacancy rate rising to 13.1% in 2008 (Statistics Bureau of Japan, 
2012). 
 
5.5 2008 Onwards: Continuous Housing Construction to Stimulate Economic 
Development in the Prolonged “Lost Decade” 
5.5.1 State regime shift toward emphasizing on service for economic recovery 
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After nearly 20 years of economic lethargy, the global financial crisis in 2008 triggered 
another recession for Japan. Japan’s annual GDP growth rate reached a historically low rate 
of minus 5.5% in 2009 since the end of the War (The Cabinet Office, 2010). The 2008 
onwards looks like an extension of the “lost decade”. The state has been continually pursuing 
economic growth through services and urban development under a neoliberal context. As 
Fujita (2011) argues that the 1989 crisis catalyzed state transit transition toward a new 
direction and the 2008 global crisis continued to push ongoing shift further. Due to the new 
international and domestic situations, new strategies to boost urban development and provide 
services have to be found out. 
When Japan felt the serious impact of the crisis, the cabinet prompted a stimulus package of 
81 trillion yen, almost 2% of Japan’s GDP, injected into the economy (Prime Minister’s 
Office, 2009a, 2009b). The state raised the slogan of “investing for the future” as the 
direction of its growth policies, which emphasized “low carbon society” and “medical 
services for older people and children” (Prime Minister’s Office, 2009a). As the state 
legitimacy now depended upon the political commitment to bring a better quality of life for 
the public, the state policy showed the political will to tackle the challenges of global climate 
change and the domestic social issues of declining birth rates and an aging population. These 
policies symbolically indicated the state’s commitment to the politics of better quality of life 
but were essentially aimed to boost domestic demand. 
 
5.5.2 Further continued housing development for economic recovery 
Urban development became the outlet for the growing capital surplus and the key to stimulate 
economic recovery again through expanding domestic demand. Taking advantage of the 
rising environmental conscientiousness across the global and the increasing domestic social 
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concerns on the declining birth rates and aging population, the justification for new urban 
developments turned to the environmental issue and concerns for children and older people. 
Concepts like “environmental model cities” (Kankyo moderu toshi), “environmental future 
cities” (Kankyo mirai toshi), and “smart cities” (Su-ma-to shi-te) were frequently used to 
label new urban developments. However, behind those labels was still the state’s consistent 
desire for growth and development.  
Take the Kashiwa no ha Smart City Project for example, this project was located in the 
northeast of the 30 kilometre band of the Tokyo Metropolitan Area. The area used to be 
undeveloped until the construction and open of the Tsukuba Express Railway with a station 
located in the heart of the area. The project was initiated in 2008 by Mitsui Fudosan Co., Ltd, 
which is one of the two largest real estate developers in Japan. The developer set three 
concepts - “health living and longevity”, “environmental coexistence”, and “innovate 
enterprises creation” to build “a new vision for the cities of tomorrow” (Mitsui Fudosan, 
2014). Unfortunately, despite these fancy labels, the project was nothing different from 
previous urban development. Despite the “smart city” title, the project was not to build a fully 
functioned city. Instead, it was essentially a mixed-use urban development which consisting 
of residential, commercial, and office development in an area of only 12.7 km2. The 
development was equipped with novel information and communications technologies, such 
as the electronic car-share system, the stand-by energy system, and the digital health 
monitoring system, to show its “smartness”.  The project inclined to simplify the complex 
social issues it claimed to solve. For example, the aim of “creating innovate enterprises” was 
supposed to be achieved by constructing an office building for individuals and enterprises to 
hold events or meetings, which was obviously unfeasible. Although the three concept raised 
in the vision is unlikely to come true, the project was still considered a success for the 
developer’s perspective. It seized the opportunities brought by the state policy moving toward 
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environment and services. By labelling “smart city”, it has attracted public funding and 
support and promoted the project to the general public. 
The state policies appeared to improve the quality of life through addressing environmental 
challenges and ageing population issue, but essentially focused on encouraging new urban 
development rather than improving the well-being of people. Under such a policy and 
political context, numerous urban development projects similar to Kashiwa no ha Smart City 
have been taking place throughout Japan. The suburb of large cities and remote areas, which 
have a higher rate of aged population and hence may probably need more resources and fund 
to tackle the associated social issues, have received little attention from the state.  
The national vacant housing stock and vacancy rate are still increasing. Although the high 
vacancy rate is spreading nationwide, the mechanism of vacancy formation differs 
geographically. In remote areas, the increase of vacancy rate is directly resulted from the 
continuous population outflow toward large cities. The background of national population 
decline, economic slump, and globalization have accelerated the speed of population loss in 
those areas. This pattern is similar to that of the high rate of vacancy housing in typical 
shrinking cities in Europe and North America.  
While in large cities, housing vacancy is showing a different landscape. Population is 
concentrating to the inner city while the suburban area is generally suffering a decline. New 
housing and urban developments are popping up on sites with developmental opportunities. 
Most of these developments are concentrated in inner cities and transit corridors. In contrast, 
under the background of economic stagnation and the slow or even negative regional growth, 
other spots concentrated with old housing are inevitability declining. The regional housing 
market has fragmented into “hot spots”, where new development and redevelopment are 
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going on, and “cold spot”, where the vacancy rate is increasing and population is declining 
(Hirayama, 2005). 
 
5.6 Discussion 
Thus far the chapter has traced the social and economic transition of post-war Japan, the 
associated shift of the Japanese state and the role of housing in the state, and the changing 
supply-demand relationship of the housing market. The role of housing in the state has been 
changing in parallel with the evolving social and economic situation. Immediately after the 
War, housing was expected to not compete with industrial recovery for scare capital and 
material resources. During the high-speed economic growth period, housing played both an 
economic role and a social welfare role, contributing to the construction industry and social 
stability. From the early 1970s when Japan’s rapid economic growth ended, housing has been 
continuously playing the economic role to spur domestic demand and revitalize economy, 
while the economic role in difference periods differed due to the changing political and 
economic ideology and social-economic situations. 
Critical junctures triggered by outside crises have been shaping state policies, the way 
housing was being centralized in the state, and the pathway of housing development. The 
logic of these processes is that the central government has always been seeking to maximize 
housing’s contribution to national economic growth through institutional measures. This 
logic is rooted in developmentalism and Japan’s “developmental-universalist” productive 
social welfare which believe that social welfare should contributes to economic growth. This 
belief was a slow-moving institution that has seldom changed in the past seven decades after 
the War. 
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The chapter has also explained why Japan’s housing vacancy rate is so high. This questions 
must be answered from a historical perspective. From the early 1970s when Japan’s high-
speed economic growth ended, the state has been pushing housing construction continuously 
to stimulate domestic demand and drive economic growth. The pro-growth housing policies 
have been encouraging continuous housing construction in the era of little housing shortage 
and hence led to an oversupply of housing. Decades of overbuilding ultimately contributed to 
the current extremely high vacancy rate. The state has been playing a pivot role in these 
processes. Although the state never intends to produce plenty of vacant housing and driving 
the vacancy rate high, the vacant housing crisis is an inevitable result of the state’s pro-
growth housing policies. 
Many Japanese domestic debates on the vacancy issue emphasize the effect of demographic 
change. The demographic composition of the Japanese society has been drastically 
transforming due to increasing life expectancy, delaying marriage, and declining fertility rate, 
which are general demographic trends happening in the developed world. The household 
structure is becoming increasingly variegated. The conventional nuclear family household 
mode is declining while non-conventional households such as one-person, elderly-only, 
couple-only, single-parent households are increasing. The suburban detached housing, which 
targets nuclear families are no longer suitable for the new household structure. Households in 
smaller size have more demand on small size condominiums in the inner city. However, 
attributing the increase of vacancy rate to demographic change is wrong. Obviously, 
advanced capitalist countries with similar demographic trends generally do not have such a 
high national vacancy rate. It was not the demographic change that drove the vacancy rate 
high. As this chapter has demonstrated, the state plays a dominant role on boosting housing 
construction in an already over-built era. The increase of vacant housing stock and vacancy 
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rate is a result of the interaction among the state, society, and market, with the state playing a 
pivot role. 
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Chapter Six: The Vacancy Crisis, Policy Responses, and Social Impact 
In recent years, the high level of housing vacancies has attracted wide attention from social 
media, civil society organizations, and researchers in Japan. Furthermore, both the central and 
local governments have taken policy measures to tackle this issue. The chapter examines how 
the vacancy issue has been defined and understood in Japan, reviews and evaluates the 
current policies, and analyzes the social impact. 
 
6.1 The Problem Definition and the Reason 
It is only until around the mid-2000s that the vacant housing issue started to receive 
substantial social attention in Japan. Using the keyword of “akiya” (literally means vacant 
housing in Japanese) to search in CiNii Database, which is one of the largest academic 
databases in Japan, 1170 results came out but of which only 1.2% was published before 2000. 
However as mentioned before, the national vacancy rate exceeded 9% in the mid-1980s and 
10% in the mid-1990s. These numbers were already very high if comparing internationally. 
Therefore, the timing of the public becoming aware of the phenomenon indicates that it was 
not the specific number of vacancy rate that triggered public attention. 
Rather, the phenomenon of housing vacancy draws the public’s attention because of housing 
deterioration and the associated environment and rebuild issues. Deteriorated detached 
housing without decent maintenance is liable to cause negative environmental impacts. For 
example, problems like damages to city landscape, potential safety hazards, non-
domesticated animals and homeless coming into, and becoming trash dumps have been 
reported by domestic mass media frequently. 
The situation in vacant apartments is somehow different, as vacant apartments generally do 
not cause the environmental problems like abandoned detached housing does. They receive 
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public attention mainly for the rebuilding issue. As buildings deteriorate and become 
functionally obsolete, major repairs and even rebuilding are needed to keep the building in a 
habitable condition. However, it is extremely difficult to achieve an agreement on repair or 
rebuilding plans among hundreds of household living in the same building. In Japan, more 
than one million condominiums were over 30 years old and need rebuild (AshahiKasei, 
2013), while only 230 of them either had completed or were in the process of rebuilding until 
April, 2014 (MLIT, 2014a). The financial issue is a major concern for apartment residents on 
rebuilding. As analyzed in the previous chapter, the property value of old condominiums 
have decreased sharply because of the shifting hot and cold spots in the regional housing 
market. Pouring a substantial amount of money into improving the building would generate 
little capital return in the future. Consequently, more and more apartments became vacant and 
even abandoned. 
The social concern on housing vacancy in Japan is tightly related to housing deterioration. 
This point explains why it is the past decade that has witnessed the boom of social debates on 
housing vacancy. The average life expectancy of Japanese dwelling is only between 25-40 
years (Ronald, 2009). Such a non-durable approach to housing, associated with cultural 
perceptions of transience and renewal, are embedded in the aesthetic pattern of Japanese life 
(Hendry, 2012). Now, the large amount of housing built in the high-speed economic growth 
period of the 1950s-1970s are approaching their life expectancy. Housing deterioration and 
the associated negative environmental impacts and rebuilding issues are rising. These issues 
are often associated with housing vacancy because old housing is more likely to become 
vacant than new housing. 
In Japan, housing vacancy is mainly perceived as an issue associated with housing 
deterioration, rather the phenomenon of housing vacancy itself. This is understandable 
because the public generally does not keep an eye on the specific number of vacancy rate 
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published in official statistics. Also, the public has little idea about how high a vacancy rate is 
too high. In contrast, the negative influences to the physical environment are visually 
significant and may cause complaints from the surrounding neighbourhood. The restorations 
and rebuilding of old condominiums relate to whether the housing is physically livable. These 
issues are close to the public’s everyday life and hence have captured social attention. 
 
6.2 Policy Response and Policy Evaluation 
As the above discussion indicates, housing vacancy became a social issue in Japan mostly 
due to concerns on associated negative environmental impacts and rebuilding issue. The 
governments’ vacant housing policies directly respond to these social concerns. To address 
the environmental issues, the policies provide financial supports for the reuse of vacant 
housing and advise the house-owner to keep minimum maintenance. On the national level, 
the central government has initiated the Vacant Housing Reuse Project (Akiya saisei nado 
suishin jigyo) in 2001. The project provides partially funding for the reuse (but limit to reuse 
for public purposes) or demolishment of housing that has already caused the deterioration of 
residential environment, despite whether it is vacant. In 2015, the Cabinet Office has enacted 
Act on Special Measures Concerning the Promotion of Vacant House Countermeasures 
(Akiya nado taisaku no suishin ni kansuru tokubetsu sochiho). The Act legally specifies the 
local governments’ responsibility to address the vacancy issue. It requires local governments 
to collect information on vacant housing in their jurisdictions and make efforts to develop a 
vacant housing database, establish measures to reuse vacant housing, supervise the owner of 
vacant housing to keep minimum maintenance (MILT, 2014b). On the local level, initiated by 
Tokorozawa City in 2007, a few local municipalities have established vacant housing 
regulations to advice the owners of abandoned housing to keep minimum maintenance to 
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alleviate the environmental impact. Moreover, some municipalities has established the 
Vacant Housing Bank (Akiya Bank) to collect and release information on vacancy in an 
attempt to find potential buyers. 
Policies on reconstruction of apartment buildings are not vacant housing policies in a narrow 
sense because the target is not vacant housing. Still, these policies are reviewed here as they 
aim to address the issues associated with vacancy. The MILT together with local 
municipalities provides funding for some types of condominium reconstruction. Under the 
“Good-quality Building Promotion Project” (Yuryo kenchikubutsu nado seibi jigyo), up to 
two-thirds of the cost of investigation and design before and after the decision of rebuilding is 
funded. Under the “City Center Housing Provision Project” (Toshin kyodo jutaku kyokyu 
jigyo), up to two-thirds of the costs of investigation and design, land readjustment, and joint 
facilities are funded. However, both of these grants only target apartment buildings in 
designated areas, most of which are located in the city center. Obviously, the target only 
covers a small proportion of deteriorated apartment buildings. These projects essentially aim 
to promote inner city redevelopment, rather than alleviate the building deterioration problem. 
Arguably, the governmental policies on vacant housing are highly selective. Subsidies for 
reuse of detached vacant housing are only eligible for those that have already caused 
significant environmental impacts. Subsidies on condominium reconstruction only target 
buildings in specific locations - inner city. Hence, it is unsurprised that these policies have 
failed to reduce the vacancy rate and vacant housing stock. 
 
6.3 The Impact on Households: The Perspective of Home Ownership as Asset-based 
Welfare 
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The social impact of the vacancy issue has been long-term ignored. This section refers to the 
idea of home ownership as asset-based welfare to explore the social impact upon households. 
An asset-based approach to welfare recently appeared under the background of neoliberalism 
and the increase of governmental fiscal difficulties on social welfare provision. This approach 
refers to that the government retrenches from direct provision of welfare, while places greater 
responsibility on individuals for their own welfare needs through investing in assets that 
augment in value over time (Doling & Ronald, 2010). Owner-occupied housing is regarded 
as an important asset in the asset-based approach to welfare. The tremendous potential wealth 
tied up in owner-occupied housing increases the welfare capacity and economic security for 
families, thus can greatly ease the governmental burden of welfare costs.  
Japan’s welfare system is characterized by small-scale state welfare and an explicit reliance 
on home ownership (Hirayama, 2010). The post-war housing policies have fostered the 
expansion of home ownership and built up an ownership society. Japan’s home ownership 
rate expanded rapidly during the high-speed economic growth period of the 1950s-1970s and 
remained at around 60% since then (Statistics Bureau of Japan, 2014). The home ownership 
rate differs greatly across age groups. Generally speaking, the rate is low among younger age 
groups and high among older age groups. Among household head of over 65 years old, the 
home ownership rate was about 80% in 2013 (Statistics Bureau of Japan, 2014, p. 16). 
Similar to that in the western developed countries, from the 1980s, the Japanese government 
has been further retreating from directly providing welfare and turned to embrace an asset-
based approach toward welfare. Affected by the policy turn, Japan’s extraordinarily large 
older population are disproportionately cash-poor and housing-asset-rich (Izuhara, 2007).  
As the research has uncovered, the pro-growth housing policies have been encouraging the 
construction of new housing and thereby accelerating the depreciation of old housing from 
the 1990s. These policies have undermined the foundation of housing as asset-based welfare, 
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which was set up on the assumption that house prices increase faster than inflation for all 
time (Doling & Ronald, 2010). In Japan, owner-occupied housing no longer produce capital 
gains but generate capital losses. Numerous Japanese households and particularly older 
households now realize that their savings embedded in their housing property are worth 
remarkably less than they previously assumed. The reliability of housing property as an asset 
was severely undermined. The older households, who have suffered from the deprecation of 
their housing, have to face a financial instability and a great deal of uncertainty in their old 
life. This is a serious problem as Japan has a relatively high home ownership rate and a high 
proportion of older population. 
 
6.4 Discussion 
The chapter has shown how the public and the governments have perceived the vacancy 
issue. The public’s concerns primarily focus on the environmental impact caused by detached 
vacant housing and the rebuilding of deteriorated apartment buildings. The governments have 
responded to the public’s concerns by making policies to reduce the environmental impacts 
and facilitate reconstructions of deteriorated condominiums. Unfortunately these policies to 
address the vacancy issue are inherently half-hearted due to their selective nature. 
The chapter has uncovered the social impact of the vacancy phenomenon, which has been 
long-term ignored. The state-driven vacancy is essentially a housing-centred exploitation. It 
invisibly transfers homeowners’ property to the state and hence strengthens the state to 
pursue the developmentalist goals. The overbuilding of housing has increased virtually all 
households’ burden of housing costs. Particularly, older households, who have suffered from 
a sharp depreciation of their housing property, have to face increased financial instability and 
uncertainty. 
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Chapter Seven: Conclusions 
The thesis has integrated a political economy perspective and a historical institutionalist 
approach to explore the logic of the centrality of housing development in capitalism. 
Applying the framework to the case of housing development in post-war Japan, the research 
referred to the theory of the developmental state to understand Japan’s macro political 
economy and productive welfare capitalism to understand the role housing plays in the state. 
The empirical analysis used a “punctuated equilibrium” model to examine the evolution of 
the Japanese state and the change of the role of housing within it throughout the post-war 
period. Japan’s post-war economic development was divided to five historical periods, in 
which the state adopted different strategies to boost economic growth and different measures 
to manipulate housing for economic purposes. Structured by the concepts of critical junctures 
and fast-moving/slow-moving institutions in historical institutionalist analysis, the empirical 
analysis traced the continuities and changes of the state and the consequent change in the role 
housing played in the state. 
The keys to explain the logic of the centrality of housing development in capitalism in the 
Japanese case lie on the developmentalist nature of Japanese capitalism, the continuities and 
changes of the post-war evolution of the state, and the consequent change in the role housing 
played in the state. Driven by the ideology of developmentalism, the central government 
attempts to prioritize developmentalist goals. Social policies are expected to contribute to 
national economic growth rather than develop universal welfare rights for citizens. Housing 
policies has been no exception. Throughout the post-war period, the central government has 
been intervening in housing provision and consumption through a variety of measures 
including welfare policies, planning regulations, taxation, and others. The political logic lies 
in maximizing the contribution of housing toward national economic growth under distinct 
72 
social-economic circumstances in different historical periods, while the choosing of 
interventions also reaffirms path dependence. 
The final chapter seeks to move one step forward - empirically and theoretically - from what 
the research has found out. Firstly, it discusses why Japan continuously focused on housing 
for economic purposes. Then, it speculates briefly on the future of Japanese housing, provides 
policy implications, and draws lessons learnt from Japan. Finally, it summarizes the academic 
contributions and identifies the limitation of the research. 
 
7.1 Why the Central Government Chose Housing Development for Economic Stimulus 
It is hard to resist wondering why the Japanese state has been continuously focusing on 
housing for economic stimulus for such a long period. One obvious reason is that housing can 
be easily manipulated to circulate capital and thus boost economic growth. Housing 
construction has strong ripple effects into related industries and thereby can stimulate 
domestic demand instantly. Moreover, unlike further consumption growth through refining 
and updating the product, which is constrained by uncontrollable technological innovation, 
stimulating demand through housing construction is controllable at least to some degree 
(Hebbert & Nakai, 1988). This ripple effect housing development can bring is similar to the 
general urban construction in all capitalist states. 
However, one cannot help wondering if there is any other reason, since housing arguably 
possesses some unique features which are different from other components in the built 
environment. Also, two decades of economic stagnation has demonstrated that relying on 
housing for economic recovery is a failure. But still, the central government has never given 
up its effort to boost housing construction. There must be factors other than the economic one 
that motivated the central government. 
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I speculate that another important reason is the capacity of housing as a tool to centralize 
regulatory authority and capital. The ideology of developmentalism not only inspires 
economic growth but legitimizes power and resource distribution. Developmentalism 
believes in the state’s legitimacy of leads the nation in promoting economic change. Although 
the central government’s efforts to push housing construction for economic recovery was 
proved as a failure, as this research has uncovered, these efforts have invisibly transferred 
households’ property to the state. Thus, the central government has successfully centralized 
regulatory authority and power of resources distribution under the context of economic 
stagnation and neoliberalism. 
The capacity of housing being used by the central government to centralize capital and power 
is embedded in the specialities of housing. The first is the dual feature of housing as both a 
market commodity and a welfare good. The second is the immense capital tied up in owner-
occupied housing. The third is the institutional thickness of housing, indicating that the 
housing market can be easily manipulated by institutional factors. It is unlikely that any other 
item has such powerful potential as housing. 
 
7.2 Beyond the Vacant Housing Crisis 
The research has uncovered that the vacant housing crisis is embedded in the 
developmentalist nature of Japanese capitalism. In Japan, the ideology of developmentalism 
is certainly not limited to the realm of housing. It is spreading to virtually every corner of 
social life. For example, the social welfare system is supposed to primarily to contribute to 
economic growth rather than the well-being of people (Holliday, 2000). The Japanese model 
of urbanisation and planning has been consistently directing the majority of resources to 
national economic development, while spending the barest minimum on social overhead 
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capital (Sorensen, 2002, p. 333). The Japanese economic life was structured to boost savings 
and the financial system directs money from household savings in public and private 
financial institutions into state institutions to finance the state growth policies (Aoki, 2001). 
Fujita (2011) calls for the state to change its mindset on economic nationalism to emphasis on 
well-being of people. However, such a change is unlikely to occur in the near future. Japan’s 
economic nationalism is driven by the ideology of developmentalism, which is a slow-
moving institutions. Slow-moving institutions such as culture and value do not occur 
overnight (Roland, 2004). During the seven decades of Japan’s post-war period, the central 
government’s ideology of developmentalism has changed little. Hence, it is almost certain 
that, housing will continue to be used as an instrument to boost economy growth and 
centralize capital and power. As probably no other items can replace such roles of housing, 
the increase of the vacancy rate is likely to continue in the future. 
 
7.2.1 Policy implications 
Although the research aimed to provide policy suggestions for addressing the vacant housing 
crisis, unfortunately so far it is unable to propose any concrete policy. The cause of the high 
level of housing vacancies is rooted in the developmentalist ideology of Japanese capitalism, 
which is a slow-moving institution. The vacant housing crisis is an issue far beyond the 
housing sector. It cannot be solved just by a couple of policies. Still, I want to provide the 
policy makers with a “bottom line” here. 
First, the policy makers need to reconsider what are the goals for vacant housing policies. 
The existing policies addressing the vacant housing issue have focused on the environmental 
impacts associated with abandoned detached housing and the reconstruction of old 
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condominiums. However, the wider social impacts on households has been ignored. Vacant 
housing policies should consider the affected households and address their needs. 
Second, policies addressing this issue must take developmentalism into consideration. Any 
effort aiming at reducing the vacant housing stock without considering the value of 
developmentalism is likely a recipe for failure. Furthermore, vacant housing policies should 
be considered not in isolation, but as an integrated part of overall social policies. 
Last but not least, continuing housing policies as economic policies cannot benefit economic 
growth in the long-term. These policies have already generated tremendous social costs, as 
manifested by the large volume of vacant housing spreading over the country. The policy-
makers should reconsider the cost and benefit of such policy approach toward housing. 
 
7.3 Learning from Japan 
Under a neoliberalism context and an asset-based approach to social welfare, more and more 
capitalist countries have increasingly relied on the market in providing housing and 
emphasized the economic effects of housing. With decades’ experience of centralize housing 
for economic purposes, Japan could produce some important lessons for the rest of the world. 
First, Japanese experience shows that relaying on housing development for economic growth 
is unfeasible, particularly in the long-term. After the 1989 bubble economy, the state has been 
increasingly relying on housing and urban development for economic recovery, but Japanese 
economy has shown little signs of recovery so far. Economic development is fundamentally 
about the development of the productive forces through continuous disruption and innovation 
(Storper, 2013, pp. 65, 224). Housing development may has effects on stimulating domestic 
demand in the short-term but cannot advance economic growth in the long-term. 
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The second lesson is that pro-growth housing policies appear highly problematic particularly 
for the long-term consequences in terms of social inequity. Housing is an important 
component of household wealth. Pro-growth housing policies mean that housing policies vary 
with social-economic situations, rather provide constant and universal housing rights to 
people. Thus, housing-centered social inequality is easily generated between groups of 
households that enter home ownership at different time. In Japan, unlike the older cohort that 
entered home ownership relatively smoothly during the rapid economic growth period, 
younger cohort households into the home-ownership market has progressively been delayed 
(Hirayama, 2010b). Moreover, neo-liberal policy has especially affected the housing 
conditions of who have been beyond the protection of conservative institutions, i.e. 
unmarried individuals, low-income households and those in unstable employment. 
(Hirayama, 2010a). Such housing-centered social inequity has also been observed in other 
countries in which the state aggressively intervening housing for economic purposes. For 
example, in China, due to the upsurge of housing price driven by the state in the past decade, 
it became increasingly difficult for the younger generation to enter homeownership, while 
those already hold homeownership have enjoyed a considerable capital gain. Economic 
conditions relating to home ownership have become stratified rapidly in Chinese cities. In 
Canada, the state has been a central player in the institutionalization of mortgage 
securitization, leading to the rising rates of homeownership greater spatial segregation of 
wealth within cities (Walks, 2016).  
 
7.4 The Logic of the Centrality of Housing Development in Capitalism 
The Japanese case indicates that, the different way that housing development being 
centralized in capitalism is fundamentally structured by the different dominant economic 
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ideologies rooted in individual capitalist states. The underlying economic ideology 
determines the state’s value regarding what role housing should play in the capitalist state. 
The concrete institutional measures that centralized housing development in the capitalist 
state is a result of the state responding to the changing domestic and international 
circumstances over time. That process can be viewed as an interaction between slow-moving 
institutions of ideologies (both the internal underlying ideology, such as developmentalism, 
and external influential ideologies, such as Keynesianism and neoliberalism) and fast-moving 
institutions of existing political and policy institutions. The dynamic of the interaction 
reflects the different patterns of change of different types of institutions, also reaffirming path 
dependence. 
The theorizing here is very tentative. Admittedly, it is immature to theorize only based on the 
case study of only one country. Under the framework of political economy and historical 
institutionalism this research has created, more case studies are expected to be conducted to 
improve the theorizing on the logic of the centrality of housing development in capitalism.  
 
7.5 Limitations 
All studies have limitations. For this study, the contradiction between the national scope and 
long historical span the research has taken and the limited time and funding to conduct the 
research has led to two major limitations. The first limitation is about the exclusive focus on 
the role of the central government. The second limitation is on the methodology of data 
collection. 
First, the research has taken the national state as the unit of analysis and treated the state as a 
“black box” through which the state’s intention was simply translated. The case study was a 
national-level analysis mainly from the perspective of the central government. Such a 
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perspective is obviously narrow as it has ignored other political actors and political processes 
on other scales and across different scales. Although the central government has played a 
dominant role in Japan’s post-war socioeconomic development, ignoring the influence of 
other political actors is problematic. As urban regime analysis suggests, power is fragmented 
and dispersed among governments and private actors (Mossberger & Stoker, 2001). These 
actors have different interests and preferences from that of the central government. The 
interests of these oppressed groups always play an important role in institutional change 
(Roland, 2004). There remains the question of how other political actors including local 
governments, real estate companies, and civil society groups have shaped the central 
government’s policy-making and policy implementation. The role of other political actors 
and their impact on housing development are expected to be explored in future studies. 
Second, the research is based to a large extent on unobtrusive methods of data collection. 
Most of the empirical evidence was drawn from archival and secondary data. This measure of 
data collection benefits the research in terms that it enabled the research taking a national 
scope and seven decades of historical span under the constraint of time and funding for 
conducting the research. However, it has unavoidable bias due to the process of selective 
deposit and selective survival. Selective deposit occurs because biases influence what 
information is recorded; selective survival occurs because different archival records have 
different possibilities to survive the ravages of time (Palys, 2003, p. 225). The empirical 
analysis may be strengthened from first-hand information, particularly interviews with 
relevant governmental policy-makers. 
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